Across the Causeway: A Multi-dimensional Study of Malaysia-Singapore Relations

4. Seeds of Separation

52 Mohamad Abu Bakar 52 4 S���S ��� S��������� ���S ��� S��������� ��� S��������� ��� S��������� S��������� ��������� Mohamad �bu Bakar The Malaya-Singapore merger of September 1963 was attempted out of necessity by those who had different, if not, conflicting agendas. The fact that it foundered hardly two years later speaks volumes about the incompatibility of their interests. The seeds of separation were sown almost right from the days when the protagonists of the Federation of Malaysia, or pro-merger enthusiasts, set out to achieve their “common goals”. Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Malaysia proposal, of course, was a signal of significant shift in Malaya’s Singapore policy, but it also constituted the basis of their conflict relations. While his cooperative stance enabled the full realization of the Malaysia plan, it too had brought about the proliferation of old conflicts, the eruption of new ones, and ultimately the creation of intramural crisis situations. The bargaining process that ensued and the The bargaining process that ensued and the The bargaining process that ensued and the diplomatic communication that developed before and after merger, apart from establishing Malaya’s and Singapore’s priority goals in the region, evinces the different contextual features which governed their relationship. ��� S������ �� S������ S������ ������ The unification of Malaya and Singapore was apparently a pre-condition laid down by the British for the establishment of Malaysia,1 and as such, it was no easy matter for Tunku Abdul Rahman who had set his sight on just the Borneo territories to come to terms with it. In case of non-compliance, Malaya might not have its way. Seeds of Separation 53 The Malayan Premier had consistently argued against merger in the past. However, after May 1961, it became clear that Kuala Lumpur’s response was increasingly becoming disproportionate to Singapore’s actions, in terms of its willingness to accommodate the semi-independent territory and what went with it. Since Tunku Abdul Rahman was faced with a fait accompli, as noted above, the atmosphere surrounding Malaya’s approach to the merger issue must therefore be seen as a contributory factor for the eruption of several intramural crises themselves. Firstly, both sides, while simultaneously Firstly, both sides, while simultaneously Firstly, both sides, while simultaneously acting as merger-savers and path-takers, were driven into various bargaining frameworks under increasing pressure of time. Secondly, the promise of union, with all its attendant benefits, induced many non-accommodative tendencies in Singapore, in particular, and as events spiralled out of control, the conflicting parties became caught in not just ordinary verbal bargaining, but also a contest of wills. The so-called about-turn in Tunku Abdul Rahman’s policy towards Singapore did not reflect any basic change in his understanding of the island’s identity and nature and their implications for neighbouring Malaya. There was no compelling economic reason either for Kuala Lumpur to give a second thought to the idea of merger. Previously, Tunku Abdul Rahman’s concern Previously, Tunku Abdul Rahman’s concern Previously, Tunku Abdul Rahman’s concern about the semi-independent British colony revolved around his anxiety over its predominantly Chinese population and left-wing drift in politics. However, However, However, these pointedly remained facts of life in Singapore especially at the time Malaysia was presented by Tunku Abdul Rahman.2 The threat arising from them was as real then as it was before. The Malayan leader, needless to say, was cognizant of the danger they might pose in the event of merger.3 On top of that, Malaya had just witnessed the end of a protracted war against a communist insurrection. This logically made the idea of merger all the more untenable. As Maddox pertinently puts it, Tunku Abdul Rahman was “in no mood to assume responsibility for the Singapore ‘hotbed’ of leftwing agitators, subversives and militant unionists”. .4 In spite of his earlier misgivings, he had shown his readiness to “embrace the Chinese city-state in a wider political union”. It is possible, if not probable, that the Malayan Prime Minister was willing to gamble his way, now that he could confidently count on the British for further help. One is also inclined to think that Tunku Abdul Rahman backtracked on his earlier idea regarding Singapore only as a temporary measure; once he had already bagged the Borneo territories, he could dispense with Singapore. Not surprisingly, virtually throughout the merger negotiations, Kuala Lumpur always played it hard when it came to acceding to Singapore’s wishes and accommodating its demands. [3.15...