Russia-ASEAN Relations: New Directions

6. China’s Peace Offensive in Southeast Asia and Russia’s Regional Imperatives

China’s Peace Offensive and Russia’s Regional Imperatives 53 6 China’s Peace Offensive in Southeast Asia and Russia’s Regional Imperatives Victor Sumsky A STATE OF THE ART EXERCISE A totality of China’s activities in Southeast Asia at the dawn of the new millenium is often defined as charm or peace offensive, and there is no affectation in these definitions. Although in fact it got started somewhat earlier, many analysts tend to associate its full-scale launching with the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of China. In November 2002, less than a week before the opening of the Congress, ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed The Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, making a pledge to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) in ten years. The parties also signed joint declarations on cooperation in the struggle with nontraditional security threats and on conduct in the South China Sea area. The second document, not solving the famous territorial disputes in this part of the world, seemed especially valuable for Beijing’s partners as a sign of its readiness to work together on issues of discontent with other claimants to the South China Sea islands and with ASEAN as a whole. 06 RUS_ASEAN Relations Ch 6 10/10/07, 12:13 PM 53 54 Victor Sumsky In less than a year, as the PRC acceded to the Balinese Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, China and ASEAN announced the establishment of a “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” (October 2003). From that time on, the process of formalizing strategic partnerships has continued at bilateral levels between China and individual ASEAN members. One of the last agreements of this type was signed with Indonesia in April 2005. The dynamic of trade and economic relations corresponds with the intensity of diplomatic contacts and the cheerful tonality of joint statements. If in the mid-1990s China’s annual total trade with ASEAN was around US$15 billion, in 2002 it exceeded US$50 billion, in 2003 came close to US$70 billion and in 2004, according to the statement by the PRC Chairman Hu Jintao made during a visit to the Philippines (April 2005), reached US$105.9 billion. Quoting these numbers, he expressed confidence that by 2010 China and its Southeast Asian neighbours would be able to increase their trade up to US$200 billion due to the FTA arrangements.1 It should be mentioned that both Hu Jintao and the PRC State Council Premier Wen Jiabao (whose rise to the top positions in the party and state hierarchies was also formalized at the Sixteenth Congress) have made a very good showing as skilful diplomats and promoters of Chinese interests in the region, often visiting the ASEAN capitals, welcoming the ASEAN leaders at home and enjoying their confidence. All this combined eventually contributed to the convening of the First East Asian Summit (Kuala Lumpur, December 2005). Notwithstanding all the scepticism about its results and meaning, this meeting is still seen as a first step towards the creation of a new integration grouping, where, in the absense of the United States, China will occupy a central position. The fact that China’s peace offensive (hereafter referred to as CPO) is not unanimously applauded, is hardly a surprise. What is remarkable, however, is that the mastery displayed in the process of this operation is admired even by observers from the less than friendly camp. One of them, Professor Marvin C. Ott of the U.S. Defense College, has described the Chinese policy vis-à-vis Indonesia as “a thing of beauty”. On another occasion he spoke about China’s “beautifully conceived and operationally sophisticated strategy” on a regional scale.2 Understanding very well what prompted Ott to express his opinions in these words, the author would like to specify the aspects of CPO that make it look convincing and consequent, balanced, flexible, well-composed and therefore beautiful. 06 RUS_ASEAN Relations Ch 6 10/10/07, 12:13 PM 54 China’s Peace Offensive and Russia’s Regional Imperatives 55 ASPECTS OF CPO’S BEAUTY First, at the heart of this policy are vital national interests, so obvious and substantial that even a Sinophobe cannot negate them in a sweeping manner. Continued economic growth upon which the fate of mainland China depends so much, requires uninterrupted supplies of energy...