ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects

4. Strengthening Cooperation in the ASEAN Regional Forum: An ASEAN View

Strengthening Cooperation in the ASEAN Regional Forum: An ASEAN View 31 4 Strengthening Cooperation in the ASEAN Regional Forum: An ASEAN View Mohamed Jawhar Hassan INTRODUCTION The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is now a decade old. During this period it has not progressed much beyond Stage One, namely, the promotion of confidence-building measures. It has begun to discuss preventive diplomacy, but has not developed or implemented any. As for StageThree, the development of conflict-resolution measures, the ARF has even decided to be more cautious, renaming it “elaboration of mechanisms for conflict settlement”. Ten years into its formation, it is perhaps fair to note that the ARF is at a stage where it is deeply engaged in confidence-building, and is testing the ground for preventive diplomacy. Assessing the ARF’s record through the nomenclature of confidencebuilding , preventive diplomacy and elaboration of mechanisms for conflict settlement, however, does not do justice to the substantive preliminary work done by the ARF in the fields of counter-terrorism especially, but also on maritime security and transnational crime. Lumping this work under the terminology of “confidence-building” or “preventive diplomacy” just to 04 ASEAN-China Relations Ch 4 5/8/05, 9:01 AM 31 32 Mohamed Jawhar Hassan conform to conventional ARF ideology is both largely erroneous as well as doing an injustice to the work done. This aspect will be discussed further below. To some, especially those in the non-government sector, this progress in the ARF has been slow. To others, particularly government officials engaged in the process, the progress has been satisfactory although they concede that more needs to be done. Criticism regarding the slowness of the ARF which was initially expressed by officials from some Western countries has since abated, perhaps because they are more sanitized now of the complexities involved in the ARF, and perhaps also because they are relatively satisfied with the numerous activities that are being done by the ARF. This chapter focuses on some of the areas where the ARF could be strengthened, areas where ASEAN and China could perhaps work together to advance the mission and agenda of the ARF further. It begins with a discussion of some of the factors that need to be borne in mind when considering the subject, followed by an assessment of the achievements and shortfalls of the ARF to-date. STRATEGIC FACTORS IMPINGING UPON ARF’S DEVELOPMENT These may be summarized as follows: 1. The members of the ARF have some widely diverging security perspectives and interests. They also have different political and security cultures. There is much greater congruence in the political and security cultures of Europe, especially Western Europe for instance, than in the Asia-Pacific. These differences need to be recognized and catered to by the ARF. The situation requires flexibility and maximum accommodation, especially in the initial stages when the ARF process is still in the delicate formative phase. Pushing the ARF too hard and too fast in one direction or the other may cause severe stresses, and some countries may find their continued participation untenable. 2. The Third ARF Meeting in July 1996 confined the “geographical footprint” of the ARF for key activities to Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania. The footprint does not include the United States (and Canada). This is unfortunate for various reasons. It does not conform to the realities of the strategic environment, where the United States is an important and integral player. The U.S. is a key part of the 04 ASEAN-China Relations Ch 4 5/8/05, 9:01 AM 32 Strengthening Cooperation in the ASEAN Regional Forum: An ASEAN View 33 equation, a major protagonist, in several of the most critical security issues confronting the region, including the Korean problem, crossstrait issues, terrorism and WMD. The greatest matter for security concern in the region is in fact Sino-American relations, and this cannot be addressed by merely looking at one of the players; the policies of the U.S. need to be scrutinized too. Confining the footprint to the countries of East Asia and Oceania also tends to make them the “object” of security deliberations that involve other participating states. This situation makes some of the “subject” countries sensitive and wary to perceived intrusion and “management” by outside powers. There is no reciprocity, and the situation is not conducive to equal relationships. 3. There is no powerful defining and overarching...