China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian

5. China Responds

70 China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 5 China Responds As a long-term strategy, Beijing will continue to insist on the “one China” principle, and push for political negotiation on reunification, earlier “three links”, as well as cross-strait cultural and educational exchanges. It will continue to encourage Taiwanese business people to invest in the mainland. Internationally, China will continue to improve its relations with its Asian neighbours and avoid a head-on collision with the United States so that any radical push by the DPP towards independence could only have very limited impact. So long as it can maintain internal stability and sustain its economic growth and military modernization, China believes that time is on its side. Before the time comes, Beijing will try hard to keep its head cool against any impetuous and premature actions. Political Pressure Chen’s surprising election did not shock Beijing into taking military actions. Even before the election, it had already made the assessment that Chen, if elected, would avoid an immediate showdown on the issue of independence. As early as the National Conference on the Taiwan issue in late March 2000, Beijing had already told the participants (directors of the Taiwan Affairs Offices in various provinces of China) of its assessment that Chen would continue Lee’s separatist policy and foster the growth of indigenous Taiwanese nationalism. He would try to perpetuate the current state in which there was neither reunification nor declared independence. This would allow time for the independence movement to gradually erase the cultural and sentimental ties between mainland China and Taiwan, and to reduce resistance against separatism at home.1 Beijing was prepared for a “long-term struggle with Taiwan’s independence forces”. Reproduced from China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian by Sheng Lijun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 71 China Responds© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore At the Beidaihe meetings of the Central Committee of the CCP in July–August, a consensus was reached that as long as Chen did not declare independence, and it was unlikely in the near future, there would be no need to take military action on Taiwan.2 The meetings set the general guidelines of China’s Taiwan policy. Though the details still remain unknown, it is clear that there is no dramatic change in its Taiwan policy. President Jiang Zemin received U.S. Congressman Archer during the meetings and told him that there would be no change in the basic policy of peaceful reunification under the “one country, two systems” formula.3 At the meetings, President Jiang Zemin reportedly said that the more Beijing was confronted by major threats, the more it should adhere to Deng Xiaoping’s teaching to focus on economic development first,4 as time would then be on China’s side in dealing with the Taiwan issue. In the late 1970s, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had designed this long journey towards modernization in three stages. Stage 1 (1980–2000) was to quadruple the 1980 gross domestic product (GDP) by 2000, which had been successfully accomplished. Stage 2 (2001–2020) was to again quadruple the 2000 GDP by 2020. This meant that by 2020, the GDP should be in the order of US$4 trillion (using the average exchange rate in the 1990s), the world’s largest in aggregate terms. At the end of Stage 3 (2021–2050), China’s per capita income should be close to that of the United States in 2000. These long-term targets have been translated into specific five-year plans. The tenth five-year plan (2001–2005) that China’s NPC adopted in March 2001 is a crucial step towards achieving these targets. During this period, China’s annual GDP growth should be above 7 per cent, to ensure its interim target of doubling the 2000 GDP by 2010. With this plan, Beijing does not want to see its agenda being hijacked by a premature solution of the Taiwan issue, especially by military means. A close examination of China’s diplomatic behaviour in the 1990s shows...