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6 China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2 Background During the Mao Zedong era, China had two distinct policies towards Taiwan. From 1949 to the early 1950s, Mao was determined to liberate Taiwan through force. From the early 1950s to the late 1970s, China, though still mainly basing its Taiwan policy on liberation through force, started to propose negotiations with Taiwan. However, Taiwan dismissed these initiatives as propaganda. Nevertheless, the two sides did try to contact each other very cautiously through secret channels, and worked out some tentative proposals and arrangements for reunification, which were similar to the “one country, two systems” formula presently proposed by China. This process, however, ceased when the Cultural Revolution began in China in 1966. From the late 1970s, when the Deng Xiaoping era started, Beijing no longer talked about liberating Taiwan through force. It formed a new policy for “peaceful reunification”. Subsequently, it launched a series of peaceful initiatives towards Taiwan. In January 1979, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) sent “A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”.1 On 30 September 1981, Ye Jianying, chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, announced a nine-point proposal for solving the Taiwan issue.2 These various statements were more conciliatory and offered more specific concessions to Taiwan than was the case previously. Apart from the proposed “three direct links and four exchanges”3 to be established before political negotiations would take place, Beijing also guaranteed in these statements that, after reunification, the present economic and social system, the armed forces, economic and cultural relations with foreign countries, and the way of life, would remain unchanged. It also appealed for an end to the military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. On the same day that “A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” was issued, China’s Defence Ministry announced the end of the two-decadelong symbolic bombardment of Kinmen Island and other offshore islands. Beijing also began to reduce its troop concentrations in Fujian province facing Taiwan. Reproduced from China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian by Sheng Lijun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 7 Background© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore It called for reunification talks with Taipei and promised that after reunification Taiwan could enjoy a high level of autonomy. Beijing’s initiatives towards Taiwan came in a blast of publicity. The weeks following Ye’s announcement saw dozens of gestures, ranging from suggestions that Taiwan jurists establish ties with the mainland to offers that Chiang Kai-shek’s remains might be brought back from Taiwan to the family tombs in his native town, Fenghua. China also took specific unilateral actions to encourage trade, such as ending customs duties on goods from Taiwan, strongly urging businessmen in Taiwan to co-operate economically with China.4 It also promised that Taiwan could retain its intelligence, administrative, and legal systems. In the new Constitution of 1982, it added a special provision; Provision 31 stipulates that it allows the setting up of a special administrative region, for which a special new law would be passed. This was targeted at both Taiwan and Hong Kong.5 On 26 June 1983, Deng proposed to “have talks on an equal footing and the third co-operation between the two parties [the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT]. [We] will not raise it as talks between the central government and a local government”. He also noted that after reunification, the two different systems could be practised on the mainland and Taiwan.6 On 22 February 1984, Deng officially announced the “one country, two systems” formula for reunification.7 Taiwan successfully absorbed the shock of the normalization of China–U.S. relations in the late 1970s, and China’s subsequent initiatives and pressure. This, in part, was due to international support from some major powers, especially the United States through its Taiwan Relations Act and continued arms sales, and partly to Taiwan’s strong tenacity and determination to survive. In the mid-1980s, there was a thaw in cross-strait relations, which developed fast...

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