China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue

9. Stalemate and Dilemma

193 Stalemate and Dilemma© 2001 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 9 Stalemate and Dilemma In previous chapters, the policies and positions taken by Beijing, Taipei and Washington have been discussed in detail. In this chapter, the rationale behind those “given facts” is examined to illustrate the stalemate and dilemma Beijing is faced with in cross-strait relations. Strategy and Rationale The key to understanding China’s Taiwan policy and its future direction lies in the understanding of its perception of (1) the international situation, (2) United States/Japan intentions with regard to Taiwan, (3) the intention of Taiwan leaders (as a whole) with regard to reunification and (4) the domestic situation. China’s persistent suspicion of U.S. intentions with regard to the Taiwan issue has long been a major factor in its Taiwan policy. Even Mao Zedong, aware that Chiang Kai-shek resisted what he saw as U.S. intentions to keep Taiwan permanently from the mainland, lent him political support. Mao said in a speech to the C.C.P. leaders in 1959: “At this point, our choice in Taiwan is between Hu Shi/Chen Cheng and Chiang Kai-shek. Who is better? Faced with this choice, I think that Chiang Kai-shek is better. Chen Cheng and Hu Shi have more connections with the United States and therefore Chiang Kai-shek is better.”1 Mao was more concerned about U.S. intentions than his arch political rival Chiang and backed Chiang against Chen Cheng and Hu Shi. In 1988, Deng Xiaoping expressed the same concern. He said: “So long as Taiwan has not been reunified with the mainland, the status of Taiwan, the status as part of the territory of China, remains uncertain. Nobody knows when it will be snatched away from us once again in the future”.2 China has always been suspicious that the United States and Japan are against Taiwan’s reunification for both geo-political and ideological reasons. This explains China’s strong opposition to the “internationalization” of the Taiwan issue. ISEAS D OCUMENT DELIVER Y SERVICE . No reproduction without permission of the publisher: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, SINGAPORE 119614. FAX: (65)7756259; TEL: (65) 8702447; E-MAIL: publish@iseas.edu.sg 194 Part IV: Conclusion© 2001 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore In 1979, its slogan was “placing the hope (of reunification) on the government of Taiwan”. In 1981, it added one more sentence: “placing the hope on the government of Taiwan and placing the hope on the people in Taiwan too”. Later, it deleted the word “too”. From 1991, it changed the wording to “placing the hope on the government of Taiwan but placing more hope on the people in Taiwan”. After Lee Teng-hui’s U.S. trip in 1995 and during the subsequent Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96, it deleted the first sentence, i.e. “placing the hope on the government of Taiwan”. It only chose to say “placing the hope on the people in Taiwan”. After the March 1996 presidential election in Taiwan, it even stopped for a while talking about “placing the hope on the people in Taiwan”. In the statement by President Jiang Zemin at the Fifteenth C.C.P. National Congress in September 1997, he only chose to say “placing the hope on those people in Taiwan who have a glorious patriotic tradition”. This change of wording reflects the evolution of China’s assessment of Taiwan politics and its increasing disillusionment with the leaders in Taiwan and even the people of Taiwan over reunification. We all know that there are now very few people in Taiwan who can meet China’s standard of “having a glorious patriotic tradition”. This is the dilemma China is faced with now. After 1998, China almost stopped mentioning “placing the hope on those people in Taiwan who have a glorious patriotic tradition.” Beijing was convinced that unlike Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee firmly believed in pursuing Taiwan’s independence, either in the name of the Republic of Taiwan or the Republic of China. Hence, it changed its strategy towards Taiwan. In a reversal of its previous strategy of keeping the United States away, China has, since 1996, concentrated its efforts on the United States. This is because, firstly, it believed that nothing, neither hard nor soft tactics, would have any effect on Taiwan, at least so long as Lee Teng-hui was in power. Secondly, without strong U.S...