China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue

8. China after the Face-Off

156 Part III: China vs. Taiwan© 2001 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 8 China after the Face-Off China’s sharp response to Lee’s visit to the United States also reflected a major change in its Taiwan policy, which will be discussed in this chapter. The rationale for the change will be presented in Part IV. Rising Nationalism and Domestic Politics To the Chinese, at least the Chinese on the mainland, the Taiwan issue is a very emotional one because it touches upon the bitter memory of 150 years of humiliation by the West and 100 years by Japan. They can agree to the “one country, two systems” formula for Taiwan, accept Taiwan’s status quo as such for the time being, and may even endorse the Taiwan model of democracy in future if it is proved to be successful. However, they cannot accept Taiwan’s independence, which in their eyes is tantamount to Taiwan being “snatched away” by foreign powers as it once was. China has lost a lot of territory over the last 150 years. This territory was ceded to foreign powers in formal treaties, mostly following China’s military defeats. No matter how the Chinese now feel about these treaties, they have to accept them as historical facts, as well as accept their consequences, such as the current China–Russian border and Mongolia’s independent status. However, Taiwan is different. To the Chinese, it has been returned to China by formal international declarations and they will not accept its independence without a good fight. With this background, no leader in China will accept the independence of Taiwan, both because of the national interest and their own political survival. The leadership in China today derives its reputation and legitimacy to rule largely from its success in terms of domestic economic reform and reunification. Mao Zedong became modern China’s founding father by liberating it. Deng Xiaoping was supported by the Chinese because of his role in saving China from the ISEAS D OCUMENT DELIVER Y SERVICE . No reproduction without permission of the publisher: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, SINGAPORE 119614. FAX: (65)7756259; TEL: (65) 8702447; E-MAIL: publish@iseas.edu.sg 157 China after the Face-Off© 2001 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore political chaos of the Cultural Revolution, in opening China to the outside world for its economic modernization and in seeing to the return of Hong Kong and Macao to China. The third generation of leaders, led by Jiang Zemin, would become national heroes if they were to succeed in getting Taiwan reunified with China. On the contrary, if they fail and Taiwan becomes an independent country, their political careers would be in great jeopardy and they would not be viewed favourably in history. Even if the status quo is maintained, they risk being seen as incompetent leaders. Jiang Zemin once said at an internal meeting, “I shall have failed in my job as party chief if significant progress on Taiwan cannot be made during my term in office.”1 This popular strong sentiment gives Chinese leaders few choices on the Taiwan issue, and since the early 1990s, it has intensified as a result of rising nationalism against what was popularly regarded in China as the U.S. policy to contain China’s rise. Consequently, there has been increasing bitterness against the United States. Unfortunately, Lee’s United States visit and his speech at Cornell University came just at this time and were therefore easily interpreted by many Chinese on the mainland as “Chinese in Taiwan helping foreigners to contain their fellow Chinese on the mainland”. Behind this lurks the memory of “Chinese traitors” who helped the Japanese against their own fellow Chinese in the Resistance War against the Japanese Invasion in the 1930s and 1940s. During the 1995–96 Strait Crisis some Chinese even cursed Lee Teng-hui, likening him to Wang Jingwei (the most notorious “Chinese traitor” in the Resistance War against the Japanese Invasion in the 1930s and 1940s). This is why there was such emotional and popular support for a harsh reaction to Lee’s United States visit and his Cornell speech. Despite the U.S. visa decision, Tang Shubei went ahead with his scheduled visit to Taiwan from 26 to 30 May 1995. While in Taiwan, he signed an eightpoint agenda to reaffirm China’s invitation to Koo for the second round of the Wang-Koo meeting. I gathered from my interviews...