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XII. Conclusion
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
Conclusion 285 C H A P T E R XII CONCLUSION Singapore is an “exceptional state” because its vulnerability — stemming from its miniscule size, its predominantly ethnic-Chinese population which traditionally has engaged in the economic activities of an entrepôt, and a geography that wedges it between two larger neighbours1 — nevertheless is paired with an astounding degree of economic success.2 It perhaps is this exceptional combination of vulnerability and excellence that also has made Singapore “the classic anticipatory state”, the energies of whose leaders are aimed at “positioning Singapore to enable it to take advantage of future developments while avoiding dangerous currents”.3 Against the backdrop of a maritime history within which Raffles had created the essential economic features of contemporary Singapore, it reappeared as a trading state after World War II by drawing on the opportunities opened up by the San Francisco System that ensured the security of 12 BRisingPowers Ch 12 8/1/07, 3:58 PM 285 286 Between Rising Powers non-communist Pacific Asian states through economic growth. Singapore went on to engage India and China in the context of a Cold War in which its early closeness to India was replaced by a movement towards China that reflected the effect of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia on Singapore’s security perceptions. After the end of the Cold War, Singapore engaged both Asian powers through a series of economic and political means, both bilateral and multilateral. As America’s Long War on Terror begins, the least that can be said is that Singapore is entrenching its relations with India within a larger framework being established by the United States, but without giving up on its engagement of China, whose containment it remains opposed to. Singapore’s engagement of China reflects Randall L. Schweller’s description of the term to mean the use of non-coercive means to blunt the non-status quo aspects of a rising power’s behaviour so that it employs its growing power in ways that are consistent with peaceful change. To that end, soft-authoritarian Singapore has played an important interlocutory role for China in its relations with the West over crucial issues such as the Tiananmen Square killings and Hong Kong’s return to the Chinese mainland. The Asian Values debate demonstrated the degree of congruence between the ideological outlook of Singapore and that of Beijing. Singapore’s measured closeness to China has been apparent, too, in ASEAN, an essential platform for China’s relations with Southeast Asia. Notwithstanding Singapore’s inability to replicate its political and economic system in the Suzhou Industrial Park, it continued to engage China, and its relations with Taiwan, whose independence it does not support, did not detract from that endeavour. 12 BRisingPowers Ch 12 8/1/07, 3:58 PM 286 [34.239.150.247] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 16:11 GMT) Conclusion 287 Has Singapore’s engagement of China been successful? It would be ridiculous to claim — and no such claim is made by the Singapore leadership — that a city-state could oblige a power of the size, history and potential of China to abide by the rules of the international order: No country could force Beijing to do so. However, it would not be immodest to claim that the Republic has facilitated the entry of the People’s Republic into a global order presided over by the advanced capitalist democracies. China’s entry has been complicated by a range of issues from trade disputes to human rights and Taiwan. At crucial points, Singapore’s interlocutory role has offered the Chinese a partnership that they could trust, not because Singapore is a Chinese-majority state but because its experience of dealing with the realities of the international order, while retaining the essential features of its political and cultural autonomy, would be useful for China. That interlocutory role no longer is in evidence for the simple reason that Beijing does not need such a partner any more. An engagement policy could be said to be successful when it does not have to be termed that any more. So it is for Singapore’s engagement of China. Engaging India is at once simpler and full of possibilities. It is simpler because there is no need for Singapore to invest political energy in playing an interlocutory role for India in its relations with the West: India’s political system makes such an effort unnecessary. It is full of possibilities because Singapore is...