Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium

3. Indonesian Responses

Samsu Rizal Panggabean 32 3 INDONESIAN RESPONSES Samsu Rizal Panggabean This chapter describes Indonesian Muslim responses to, and perspectives of, “the new world order”, and shows how they are shaped by a set of historical, economic, and political conditions, including the recent reformasi (reform) movement. The perspectives and responses are not necessarily consistent over time or substantially monolithic. All Muslims do not share them. In addition, Muslim perspectives of the new world order are closely related to perceptions of roles and positions within the domestic, national order. At the outset, it should be stated that the “Islamic factor” has historically been of secondary importance to the foreign policy of Indonesia. This was especially true during the Soeharto era. Many groups and leaders within the Muslim community in Indonesia, however, have been very much concerned about problems and issues in the Islamic world, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Gulf War, the conflict in Bosnia, and the problems of various Muslim minorities. They have argued that as the world’s largest Muslim nation, Indonesia should have a more activist foreign policy towards the Islamic world. For instance, Amien Rais, former chairman of Muhammadiyah and now the Speaker of People’s Consultative Assembly, has argued that Indonesia should identify itself more with the Islamic world than with the Far Eastern nations.1 In 1987, the Indonesian Committee for the Islamic World’s Solidarity (KISDI) was established to foster ties between Indonesian Muslims and the larger Islamic world. When Abdurrahman Wahid, the former chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, ascended to the Indonesian presidency, there was an expectation among 32 33 Indonesian Responses Muslims that his rule would be a turning point in the history of Islamic political representation in Indonesia, including in the diplomacy and foreign policy sectors. His choice of Alwi Shihab, a scholar in Islamic studies, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs further strengthened this expectation. However, to the disappointment of many Muslims, President Wahid did not address the above concerns. On the contrary, in the first weeks of his rule, he created a widespread controversy among Indonesian Muslims, including Nahdlatul Ulama, when he publicly endorsed the possibility of opening trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. In the first month of his presidency, rallies were held in many cities to protest against this proposal. The protesters accused Wahid of being “the mouthpiece of Zionism, begging Jewish money”.2 Politicians such as Faisal Basri maintained that trade relations with Israel were plausible. Basri, who was a former Secretary General of Amien Rais’s People’s Mandate Party, also criticized the ulama for fanning religious sentiment to achieve political gains. Others argued that several Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey, maintained diplomatic relations with Israel, and the controversy that surrounded the issue indicated the reluctance of Indonesian Muslims to face the possibility of a peace deal in the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, in the end President Wahid backed down. In November 1999, Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab announced that the establishment of relations with Israel was not a government policy. This controversy indicated how Muslim groups approached the issues and logic of the new international order, and how they identified specific Islamic dimensions of the situation. These dimensions included the incompatibility between Islam and the West, and the absolute and unconditional clash between the two civilizations. Many Muslim groups and leaders quoted Samuel Huntington’s gloomy vision of civilizational conflict with approval. After defeating Communism, the Christian West was seen as turning on Islam in a tumultuous, zero-sum characterization of the world order.3 Wars involving Muslim communities in the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, and other parts of the world were perceived within the larger image of incompatible relations between the West and the Muslim world. In this scenario, the dominant Western actor was the United States, and the U.S.-controlled United Nations sought international dominance at the expense of Muslim interests. Another dimension of this Muslim perspective was related to the domestic instability in Indonesia. From 1997, Indonesia faced economic crises, popular protests, and dissatisfaction with the state’s performance, all of which added fuel to the reformasi (reform) processes. Whilst popular protest had long been an intermittent feature of Indonesian politics, the frequency and magnitude Samsu Rizal Panggabean 34 of protest during the last years of the Soeharto era challenged the government as never before, and led to the fall of Soeharto on 21 May...