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73. The ASEM Process and Co-operative Engagement in the 21st Century
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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366 K. S. Nathan By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 73. THE ASEM PROCESS AND CO-OPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY K. S. NATHAN Reprinted in abridged form from K. S. Nathan, “The ASEM Process and Cooperative Engagement in the 21st Century: Challenges and Prospects”, in The European Union, United States and ASEAN: Challenges and Prospects for Cooperative Engagement in the 21st Century, edited by K. S. Nathan (London: ASEAN Academic Press and the Malaysian Association for American Studies, 2002), pp. 347–68, by permission of the author and the copyright holder (MAAS). ASEM, ARF AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY Asean regionalism — and for that matter, any broader coalition of forces at the intraregional and interregional levels — offers the best prospects for regional stability, development, security and prosperity for Southeast Asia. Despite recent setbacks ensuing from the Asian financial crisis, regional processes like Asean and ASEM tend to provide appropriate frameworks for the positive engagement of extraregional powers in economic, social and cultural exchange. ASEM as a broader process incorporating three major East Asian powers is best viewed as a complementor rather than a competitor to the EU-Asean paradigm . Neither can truly supplant the other as they are driven by similar yet different motivations and dynamics. In combination, both the EU-Asean relationship and ASEM can make a vital contribution in resource pooling for mutually beneficial regional cooperation and development. ASEM clearly builds on Asean’s established networks of dialogue partner relationships with all major economic or political entities in the world: US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, European Union, South Korea, China, India and Russia. These economic relationships serve to create a more conducive political atmosphere for substantive discussions of regional security in Asia-Pacific. Asean can now be regarded as an allinclusive regional organisation that incorporates all the ten states of Southeast Asia. With the inclusion of Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999, Asean-10 does represent a major long-term political victory in terms of strengthening regional peace and security. A strengthened Asean is conducive towards a more substantive relationship with not only the EU, but also the US as well. Regional solidarity therefore aids rather than 073 AR Ch 73 22/9/03, 12:55 PM 366 The ASEM Process and Co-operative Engagement in the 21st Century 367 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville hinders the process of establishing a multilateral security framework for Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific. Nevertheless, the multilateralisation of security in Asia will continue to be problematic in the near and distant future for several reasons: (1) sharp differences in level of development within Asean, and amongst Asian states in general; (2) serious divergences in national perceptions of “common threats” to national and regional security; (3) the persistence of territorial disputes and maritime or resource-based conflicts; (4) divergent perceptions of the utility of the security role played by external powers through formal and informal alliance arrangements with Asian states; (5) the ambiguity of response governing perceptions by medium and smaller Asian states regarding the rise of two major Asian powers viz. China and India — and their strategic role and influence into the 21st century; and (6) disagreement over the need for, and modalities of intervention in crisis situations of an “internal political character ” within Asean members, accompanied by a lack of capacity for collectively enforcing the peace — as evidenced by the East Timor Crisis of 1999. There is little doubt that existing bilateral and regional security structures have not been designed to cope with a post-Cold War situation. However, this problem was to some extent alleviated by the expansion of the Asean-PMC (Post-Ministerial Conference ) mechanism into the Asean Regional Forum (ARF), which was officially inaugurated in Bangkok in July 1994. The ARF currently comprises 23 countries viz. the Asean Ten (Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia), Asean’s ten dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, South Korea, United States, New Zealand, China, India and Russia), and Papua New Guinea, Mongolia and North Korea. There are differing perceptions of the ARF mechanism — ranging from a more positive evaluation of its future role to sceptical views about its efficacy as a multilateral security instrument. A more optimistic position asserts that the ARF — with Asean as its core, and with EU as a key participant — is the most acceptable and least...