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65. Northeast Asia and ASEAN: Security Linkages, Implication, and Arrangements
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
Northeast Asia and ASEAN: Security Linkages, Implications, and Arrangements 317 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 65. NORTHEAST ASIA AND ASEAN Security Linkages, Implications, and Arrangements KUSNANTO ANGGORO Reprinted in abridged form from Kusnanto Anggoro, “Northeast Asia and ASEAN: Security Linkages, Implications and Arrangements”, in The Role of Security and Economic Cooperation Structures in the Asia Pacific Region: Indonesian and Australian Views, edited by Hadi Soesastro and Anthony Bergin (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), pp. 66–77, by permission of the publisher. THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MAJOR POWERS It should be no less importance in that the inter-Korean relationship also entered an entirely new phase. Within the Korean Peninsula there is a new atmosphere and movement of the glacier towards a thaw in inter-Korean relations. Faced with the spectre of political isolation and a rapid economic decline in the 1990s, Pyongyang became much more accommodating in its strategy towards Seoul. In September 1991 the two Koreans were admitted to the UN, paving the way for an even more significant inter-Korean reconciliation. Among favourable factors defusing the international tensions around the Korean Peninsula, one notes the rapid full-scale development of relations between Moscow and Seoul, including the development of diplomatic relations, progress in relations between Seoul and Beijing, and the process of establishing contact between Pyongyang, on one side, and Washington and Tokyo, on the other. Like the Sino-American rapprochement if the early 1970s, the normalisation of Moscow-Seoul relations in 1990 proved to be a major catalyst for a more vigorous inter-Korean dialogue, opening up new pathways to the adoption of the “Agreement on Reconciliation, NonAggression , Exchanges, and Cooperation between South and North Korea” in October 1991. The agreement testifies, among other things, to the fact that Pyongyang recognises Seoul as the party with which it would work together in transforming the current state of armistice into permanent peace. Both sides also formed a joint nuclear control committee (JNCC) on March 1992 to settle their differences over mutual military inspections to verify the non-existence of nuclear arms and discuss the arms control between the two countries. 065 AR Ch 65 22/9/03, 12:53 PM 317 318 Kusnanto Anggoro By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville Despite all these developments, however, one should not underestimate the objective and subjective difficulties that lie in the way of unification in the nearest future. The diminution of Russia’s nuclear umbrella, for example, seemed to have strengthened the determination of the North Korean leadership to go nuclear as a matter of necessity. Both South and North Korea have been developing their missile capabilities, although they took different routes for that goal. Benefited from a security patron who deployed advanced missile in and around the Korean Peninsula, the South Korean could concentrate on developing industrial and commercial capabilities in missile-related high-technology sectors, including space and aerospace industries . In the North, missile programme is faced with absolute limitation by various constraints, including the primitive technology and lack of funds. In the light of strengthening American commitment to the South as well as the South’s military modernisation programme, a nuclear weapon programme is the most cost effective nuclear deterrence and “strategic equalizer” in its competition with the south and, even if technologically unsuccessful, to present a nuclear ambiguity. As its leverage in Moscow and Beijing has considerably weakened, what Pyongyang still possesses now is at best a certain measure of geopolitical leverage in the form of nuisance value by showing its unreliability and unpredictability. The euphoria of 1990–1992 engendered by Beijing-Seoul and Moscow-Seoul normalisation was greatly overshadowed, if not completely belied, by the Korean nuclear crisis in 1993–1994. Rounds of negotiation revealed that many contradictions in the positions of each side remain and that timeconsuming and painstaking efforts are needed to remove them. In Geneva, the United States and North Korea agreed on 21 October 1994 to resolve the nuclear issue. This is a remarkable step forward to build a peace and stability in the region. The implementation of the WashingtonPyongyang nuclear deals, however, seems to linger on for some reasons. First, the Geneva deal itself is still very fragile. Under the terms of the agreement, for example, North Korea would freeze its nuclear programme and open its sites to international inspection and will reopen an intra...