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63. Disputes in the South China Sea: Approaches for Conflict Management
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310 Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan 63. DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA Approaches for Conflict Management MOHAMED JAWHAR BIN HASSAN Reprinted in abridged form from Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan, “Disputes in the South China Sea: Approaches for Conflict Management”, in Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security, edited by Derek da Cunha (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 98–109, by permission of the author and the publisher. THE SPRATLYS, THE CLAIMANTS AND THE CLAIMS Four areas are in dispute in the South China Sea: the Paracels, which is contested by China, Taiwan and Vietnam; the Gulf of Tonkin, disputed by China and Vietnam; Pratas Island and Macclesfield Bank, contested by China and Taiwan; and the Spratlys, contested in whole or part by six littoral parties: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. This chapter discusses only the Spratlys, a group of 230 or so islets, sandbanks and reefs of which only three dozen features are above water level and none of which are more than half a square kilometre in area. China and Taiwan claim about 80 per cent of the entire South China Sea bounded by a U-shaped line that China made public in 1947 and which appears on official Chinese maps. (The China and Taiwan claims are in fact a single claim.) China believes that the Sea has been part of Chinese territory since at least the Qing or Han period. In July 1995, however, China issued a policy statement indicating that it was “ready to work together with the countries concerned to resolve appropriately the relevant disputes according to recognized international law, (and) the contemporary law of the sea, including basic principles and the legal regime defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS]”.1 In 1996 China ratified UNCLOS. Vietnam claims all the islands and features that are above sea level in the Spratlys. The Philippines claims all features (above sea level as well as submerged) in the area it calls Kalayaan (Freedomland). Malaysia claims seven features, while Brunei has laid claim to a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which includes Louisa Reef, also claimed by Malaysia. The claimants cite various grounds for their claims. China, Taiwan and Vietnam Disputes in the South China Sea: Approaches for Conflict Management 311 base theirs on ancient discovery, continuous usage and effective occupation. The Philippines claim, as contained in a presidential decree of June 1978, cites “history, indispensable need and effective occupation and control”. Malaysia’s claim is based on the grounds that the features it considers Malaysia’s are located on its continental shelf. The largest number of features — 22 — is occupied by Vietnam. China occupies 9 (including Mischief Reef), the Philippines 8, Malaysia 3 and Taiwan one (Appendix 6.1). APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION The approaches adopted by the claimants appear to be influenced by consideration of several factors which impinge upon or are a part of the strategic environment surrounding the Spratlys. Among these would be the following: • the maritime setting of the disputes; • the relatively low conflict potential of the disputes; • expectations regarding possible exploitable resources; • the low, though varying, military capabilities of the disputing parties; • the increasing military capabilities of some of the claimants, in particular China and Taiwan, but also to a much lesser extent Malaysia and most recently the Philippines; • heavy international interest in the maritime routes in the vicinity; • the special position of China, which is perceived as the most threatening power and the one most likely to initiate resort to force; and • the existing strategic balance among the major powers in the region, and the tremendous military reach and clout possessed by the United States. The conflict management approaches and mechanisms adopted by the claimants of course vary in some respects, but some generalizations can be made. Peaceful Negotiations Negotiations aimed at resolving territorial disputes have essentially been bilateral in nature. The overwhelming differences in the relative size and bargaining strength of China and the other claimants, as well as the existence of ASEAN which provides a natural grouping for the Southeast Asian claimants, have also led to calls by some of the claimants from the latter to negotiate with China on a collective basis. This move has gathered momentum especially after the Mischief Reef discovery in early 1995, which unified the ASEAN states as never before. However, as is common with negotiations regarding territory, progress has been slow. Attempts have therefore been made for some...