-
62. Alternative Security Models: Implications for ASEAN
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
Alternative Security Models: Implications for ASEAN 303 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 62. ALTERNATIVE SECURITY MODELS Implications for ASEAN WILLIAM T. TOW Reprinted in abridged form from William T. Tow, “Alternative Security Models: Implications for ASEAN”, in Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, edited by Andrew T. H. Tan and J. D. Kenneth Boutin (Singapore: Select Publishing and the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), pp. 257–85, by permission of the author and the publishers. IMPLEMENTING THE ALTERNATIVE SECURITY MODELS Southeast Asia’s post-war history is marked by the preoccupation of the elite with sustaining their political power (an intrastate security preoccupation) and by minimising their sovereignties’ vulnerability to external aggression (an inter-state security orientation). These two characteristics remain embedded as key security referents throughout most of the region, with recent events in Indonesia reinforcing the first concern and with China’s rising power base and its aspirations directed towards the South China Sea underscoring the latter. Security dilemmas remain easily concocted within such a framework, either through suspicions that the tools of violence will be readily employed either by political rivals within a nation’s own boundaries or by predator states outside of them. All three security models that have been reviewed here have something to offer in terms of modifying this obsessively brutal outlook. Constructivism invites policymakers and analysts alike to delve beneath perceived (or misperceived) interests and intentions of potential opponents. Southeast Asians are not predestined to be ethnically divided or to be geo-political enemies if they are able to fashion a regional security order, based as much on mutual social and cultural respect as on historical interests or values that may no longer be applicable. In the aftermath of Indochina’s incorporation into ASEAN, that institution’s relentless commitment to community building appears to offer a better formula for conflict prevention than any power-balancing formula currently available to the ASEAN states. The latter approach would only reinforce the Asia-wide security dilemma, which is in danger of intensifying between China and the United States, if those two countries’ engagement postures fail to endure beyond the end of the Clinton and Jiang presidencies. The ultimate measure of constructivism’s effectiveness in Southeast 062 AR Ch 62 22/9/03, 12:52 PM 303 304 William T. Tow By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville Asia, however, will hinge on how amenable both the United States and China are to reconstituting their own preferences for an ASEAN security environment. Ideally, this environment would be less influenced by great power prerogatives and more shaped by ASEAN’s own agenda. Greater understanding of how securitisation might work in a Southeast Asian context could be the first step in modifying ASEAN relations with external actors. Like constructivism, securitisation evolves around distinguishing “we-ness” from “other-ness.” Unlike constructivists, however, those who embrace securitisation may endorse divisions as a means to perpetuate power, distorting incentives for building collective identity and squandering opportunities to face structural change through coalition building. ASEAN would have been better served, for example, to desecuritise the Indonesian military’s role in East Timor far sooner than it did, rather than adhering to its long-standing habit of viewing that entity as a guardian of “nation building.” East Timor was, above all, a problem of political socialisation–securitisation — within a contested sovereign boundary, rather than a state security concern. It is the human security model, however, that posits the most significant challenge to traditional security referents in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, security is about all of us and each of us, regardless of how we may choose to organise institutions or instruments at a given time to achieve it. This model supplants the collective human rights concept. For example, in the aftermath of Asia’s financial crisis, the argument that individuals’ sacrifices will lead to more prosperous and fulfilling lives for their descendants would appear to be tenuous, if not fully discredited. It is apparent that, in the ASEAN region and elsewhere, the human security model may represent an essential element in the next decade’s security regime. Efforts to transform these three models into actual policy need to be spearheaded at the state level, where most of the resources to do so remain invested. National governments can work within institutional frameworks to implement this process. Three key aspects of such institutional coordination are: 1...