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61. The Limits of Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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The Limits of Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia 297 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 61. THE LIMITS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA JUWONO SUDARSONO Reprinted from Juwono Sudarsono, “Security in Southeast Asia: The Circle of Conflict”, in Economic, Political and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980s, edited by Robert A. Scalapino and Jusuf Wanandi (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1982), pp. 63–68, by permission of the author and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California. THE MATRIX OF CONFLICT From both the theoretical and practical points of view Southeast Asia ranks as one of the more complex regions, resulting in difficulty in establishing conceptual, much less policy-relevant, security arrangements. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union regards the entire region as an area of vital security interest. Their marginal economic and military involvements absolve them from pursuing any sustained, concerted, or coherent effort in the manner that Central Europe provides a stabilizing framework, leading to the institutionalized security interests through NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces. Of the two other major powers, neither Japan nor China possesses overwhelming political and economic preponderance over the entire region, a preponderance essential in devising a durable security framework commensurate with its short-term and long-term interests. It is this marginality and asymmetry of major power interest in the region that makes attempts at regional or comprehensive solutions difficult at best. A distribution of relative indifference among major powers can, to some extent, work to the advantage of regional powers that are seeking an autonomous solution to the security of the indigenous states. But this presumes that the regional states themselves see some commonality in extraregional sources of security threats. Indeed, the very fragility of most of the Southeast Asian states (and, no less importantly , of their governments) in turn often calls for periodic interventions by extraregional powers to secure the survival of assorted regimes within the region. Coupled with attendant problems of socioeconomic development and of domestic political management, a circle of conflict arises and creates a momentum of its own, one which neither major power nor the indigenous states themselves are able to control. The asymmetry of relationships among the major powers is compounded by a 061 AR Ch 61 22/9/03, 12:52 PM 297 298 Juwono Sudarsono By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville balance of weakness within regional states. Not one of the Southeast Asian states is likely to be able to bear its full imprint on the entire region. Vietnam since 1975 and particularly since 1979 may have achieved de facto primacy over the Indochina region, and the ASEAN states after the Bali Summit of early 1976 may claim to some semblance of influence to determine the parameters of international politics in the maritime portion of the region. But neither the Indochinese nor the ASEAN grouping is likely to be able to claim full authority over the entire area. The conflicting ebb and flow of major power involvement, the diverse strategic outlook of the Southeast Asian states in regard to the form and source of extraregional threats, and, not least, the differing priorities in economic development efforts defy attempts to achieve an immediate and practical solution to the current crises in the region. The fait accompli which the Vietnamese presented to the region in 1978–1979 heightens the complexity of the regional security situation at present. In addition to the interplay of major power involvement, regional security interests are defined by individual countries of the region according to varying levels of perception and interpretation . At times even a single country’s security perception changes markedly with the reshuffling of the composition of its government. Often the style of a particular leader or of an important faction can substantially change previously agreed understandings, necessitating perhaps a fundamental reexamination of past initiatives and commitments. THE REGIONAL APPROACH First attempts at unraveling the crisis precipitated by the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea were inspired by a common diplomatic perception among the ASEAN states that the fait accompli in Kampuchea was unacceptable on grounds of principle. Throughout most of 1979 the ASEAN states, with the support of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, condemned Vietnam for its invasion of Kampuchea and its attendant policy of evicting mainly ethnic Chinese nationals from the country. Diplomatic victory was achieved in November...