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38. Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after 11 September
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
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Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after 11 September 173 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 38. ISLAM AND SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER BARRY DESKER Reprinted in abridged form from Barry Desker, “Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after 11 September”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 3 (2002): 383–94, by permission of the author and Taylor and Francis Limited . These regional terrorist networks indicate the dimensions of the new security challenges facing Southeast Asia. The transnational al-Qaeda terrorist network will be the major security threat to governments in the region over the next decade. Because of its regional network, Southeast Asia will remain a major centre of al-Qaeda activity. However, the identification of radical fundamentalist Islam with terrorist activity risks the spread of the perception that Islam is the cause of regional terrorism, especially in states where Muslims are minorities such as Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. In reality, these radical fundamentalist Islamic terrorists represent the extreme manifestation of Wahhabism. Even for Islamists committed to the need to establish Islamic states, the approaches taken will change over time. They will reposition themselves to take advantage of political opportunities while adjusting to a changing social environment. The objectives and goals of an Islamic state will be redefined . In confronting states intent on retaining their existing identities, the strategies adopted will vary in the years ahead as they have in the past. Terrorist attacks and violent confrontations, public agitation, private resentments and attempts to infiltrate public spaces will occur. A key role will be played by Muslims from diverse backgrounds that will participate in the public debate. The debate within Indonesia sparked by Liberal Islam demonstrates one response to attempts by the Wahhabis to dominate the Islamic agenda. Its salience arises from the wider support provided by the larger community when such activists have moved to take the stage and debate issues. Similar responses elsewhere in the region will help to ensure that the Wahhabis do not emerge as the dominant voices in the Islamic debate. Our discussion has shown that the debate within the Islamic communities in the region continues. Islam is not a monolithic entity within the region. Its believers stretch from secular modernists sensitive to the multi-religious, multi-cultural fabric of societies in the region, inclusivists aware of the accommodation that Islam had made 038 AR Ch 38 22/9/03, 12:46 PM 173 174 Barry Desker By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville with existing beliefs when it penetrated the region, to revivalists seeking a return to an Islamic Golden Age and terrorists intent on overthrowing existing regimes and creating a new Muslim state linking all the territories in the region with Muslim majorities. From the perspective of regional order, the inaction of the Indonesian Government despite concrete evidence has undermined existing trends in regional security cooperation . While proponents of ASEAN previously highlighted ASEAN’s evolution into a security community1 recent developments draw attention to the risks of more open borders resulting from ASEAN arrangements to encourage increased intraregional communications, tourism and trade. It is a reminder that the creation and maintenance of a security community is dependent on the recognition by participating states that they need to cooperate when it is a neighbouring state that is threatened. The frictions among ASEAN states following the arrests of radical Islamic terrorists highlights the decline in ASEAN’s cohesion following the expansion of ASEAN to include all ten Southeast Asian states in the 1990’s, the onset of the regional financial and economic crisis and the downfall of the Soeharto regime in Indonesia. Ironically, it was during this period that radical Islamists committed themselves to establishing an Islamic state unifying the Muslim majority territories of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, southern Philippines and southern Thailand. While Singapore does not have a Muslim majority, the JI activists planning terrorist attacks in Singapore concluded that its existence at the heart of Southeast Asia required Singapore ’s incorporation into Darul Islamiyah Nusantara. Even as the original members of ASEAN wrestled with the doctrines of non-intervention and non-interference in a world where the concept of humanitarian intervention has received increasing support , they were challenged by radical Islamists seeking to create a unified Islamic state through the violent overthrow of existing regimes, and heeding calls emerging from Afghanistan, for the establishment of a new caliphate. Such irredentist visions...