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21. ASEAN Enlargement and Myanmar
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
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108 Tin Maung Maung Than and Mya Than By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 21. ASEAN ENLARGEMENT AND MYANMAR TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN and MYA THAN Reprinted in abridged form from Tin Maung Maung Than and Mya Than, “ASEAN Enlargement and Myanmar”, in ASEAN Enlargement: Impacts and Implications, edited by Mya Than and Carolyn L. Gates (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), pp. 249–61, by permission of the authors and the publisher. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS During the months of July and August 1997, the government-owned newspapers carried a series of boxed inserts entitled “Facts about ASEAN” to highlight Myanmar’s admission to the regional grouping. One stated that “Myanmar, through ASEAN, can now meet the groups wishing to pose a threat to her collectively, and make her attitude known to them in specific and precise terms and act accordingly”, and new opportunities would open up “with the help, understanding and sympathy of fellow ASEAN members”.1 On the other hand, critics of the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, formerly known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council or SLORC) maintained that by joining ASEAN, Myanmar’s military junta hoped to gain legitimacy at home and abroad.2 To some, it was seen as a calculated move by the SPDC to counter Western sanctions, criticisms, and condemnations spearheaded by the United States Government , as well as various pro-opposition lobbies and the so-called government-inexile in the form of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB). On the other hand, Myanmar authorities adamantly insist that this is not a reactive process, but a pro-active one based on changing domestic and international circumstances. In addressing the appeal of ASEAN to Myanmar, Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw alluded to the ending of the Cold War and referred to the “shared destiny” of the ten Southeast Asian nations and added that Myanmar “feel[s] that we are a Southeast Asian nation and we would like to aspire to the prosperity of Southeast Asian nations” and since “ASEAN is now very much solid in a leading role … we would like to be part of it” (Nation, 16 December 1995). The political implications of Myanmar’s entry into ASEAN may be identified in three 021 AR Ch 21 22/9/03, 12:42 PM 108 ASEAN Enlargement and Myanmar 109 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville areas: ASEAN’s relations with the West; ASEAN organizational matters and intraASEAN relations; and Myanmar’s domestic political development. From the very beginning, Myanmar’s ruling SPDC was ostracized by the Western powers, while the regional states and ASEAN have co-operated with Myanmar in its efforts to end its economic and political isolation. The United States and its European allies persistently accused the SPDC of human rights violations and suppression of democratic activists, and sought punitive measures to advance their vision of democracy . On the other hand, the ASEAN states constructively engaged Myanmar in the belief that a gradual exposure to the market economy and regional cooperative efforts would be the best way to ensure regional security and the socio-economic development of Myanmar itself. The stark contrast between these two approaches had never been clearer than when the U.S. Government imposed sanctions, and together with its European allies tried to block Myanmar’s early entry into ASEAN. However, ASEAN decided to accord full membership to Myanmar in July, in time for the Association’s 30th anniversary. In fact, on 22 April 1997 President Bill Clinton announced a ban on new American investments in Myanmar, citing “large-scale repression of the democratic opposition”. This was followed on 20 May by an executive order “prohibiting United States persons from new investments in Burma” which formalized the earlier pronouncement (Myanview, July 1997, p. 4). Despite efforts by the Clinton Administration to garner strong support from its allies, countries such as Japan, Australia, France, and Germany did not join in the U.S. censure effort. The U.S. sanction came at a time when selected purchase laws and bans on companies doing business with Myanmar by states such as California and Massachusetts, as well as cities like New York, had become the bane of both the United States and foreign companies. The European Union (EU) had withdrawn the community’s generalized system of preferences (GSP) benefits from Myanmar’s industries, and also imposed...