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20. Vietnam and Its Neighbours: The Border Dispute Dimension
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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104 Ramses Amer By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 20. VIETNAM AND ITS NEIGHBOURS The Border Dispute Dimension RAMSES AMER Reprinted in abridged form from Ramses Amer, “Vietnam and Its Neighbours: The Border Dispute Dimension”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, no. 3 (1995): 298–318, by permission of the author and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. VIETNAM’S ATTITUDE TOWARDS BORDER DISPUTES AND REGIONAL STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA From the above analysis of Vietnam’s border disputes with its neighbours, it is evident that Hanoi is pursuing a fairly consistent policy on how to settle them. Vietnam favours formal negotiations, stressing the fact that the border disputes must be handled through peaceful measures and that the concerned countries must refrain from the use of force. Vietnam has not expressed any preference for negotiations involving more than two countries to deal with border disputes; all negotiations currently under way are bilateral. This implies that the multilateral disputes, that is, overlapping claims by Vietnam and at least two other claimants, are not subject to formal negotiations . The multilateral dispute over the whole or parts of the Spratly archipelago currently involves Vietnam, Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan, and it is potentially the most dangerous conflict from a regional perspective. However, the overlapping claims in other areas of the South China Sea also present potential dangers to regional stability. The joint development agreements between Malaysia and Vietnam as well as between Thailand and Vietnam show that Vietnam is amenable to such arrangements pending the achievement of a proper delimitation of the disputed areas. Thus, Hanoi would not oppose such schemes in other bilateral territorial disputes in sea areas. Why then have such joint development schemes not been agreed upon in the following bilateral disputes: Vietnam– Cambodia, Vietnam–China, and Vietnam– Indonesia? The relatively recent military conflicts between Vietnam and Cambodia as well as between Vietnam and China could probably explain the more cautious approach when it comes to engaging in joint development projects in disputed areas because of the residual feelings of uncertainty pertaining to the counterpart’s 020 AR Ch 20 22/9/03, 12:42 PM 104 Vietnam and its Neighbours: The Border Dispute Dimension 105 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville long-term intentions. Another explanatory factor could be that Vietnam has both land and sea border conflicts with Cambodia and China and this could contribute to making joint development schemes a less attractive option. In other words, the land border disputes with Cambodia and China do not hold the potential for rewarding joint ventures because of the lack of raw materials in these areas. Furthermore, the land border disputes are primarily related to the issue of the proper demarcation of borders on which the involved parties basically agree, and the disputed areas are minor, at least in terms of land areas. With regard to the border dispute between Vietnam and Indonesia, the above factors are not relevant since there has been no military conflict between the two countries and the border dispute involves only sea areas. In fact, Indonesia has enjoyed comparatively better relations with Vietnam than any other member-state of ASEAN since the 1960s. Judging from Vietnam’s willingness to engage in joint development schemes with Malaysia and Thailand, respectively, the opposition or reluctance to enter into such schemes in the case of Indonesia and Vietnam probably stems from the Indonesian side. If attention is turned to the wider regional dimensions of Vietnam’s policy on border disputes, the first question to ask is what effect Vietnam’s accession to membership of ASEAN, on 28 July 1995,1 will have on the handling of its border conflicts. Vietnam’s membership will most certainly make the disputes with its fellow ASEAN members more manageable but it will not necessarily make their formal resolution more likely. After all, ASEAN has been successful in ensuring that disputes between its members have not evolved into open military conflicts, but several border disputes still remain unresolved twenty-eight years after the creation of ASEAN. Some examples of such conflicts are, first, those between Indonesia and Malaysia with overlapping sovereignty claims over the two smaller islands — Sipadan and Ligitan — off the east coast of the large island of Borneo, and over sea areas in the same region, and secondly, those between Malaysia and the Philippines relating to overlapping sovereignty claims to part of the...