-
19. Between China and ASEAN: The Dialectics of Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
Between China and ASEAN: The Dialectics of Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy 97 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 19. BETWEEN CHINA AND ASEAN The Dialectics of Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy DAVID WURFEL Reprinted in abridged form from David Wurfel, “Between China and ASEAN: The Dialectics of Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy”, in Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition, edited by Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses Amer (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 148–69, by permission of the author and the publisher. THE CHINA POLICY OF VIETNAM IN ASEAN There was, of course, some opposition to Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN, especially by Thailand, because of a fear that Hanoi was all too eager to use ASEAN as a club against China. One Vietnamese scholar/ official recognized in 1994 that “in the short period after joining, it would be difficult for Vietnam to take the lead or put forward its own initiative on security issues as Hanoi needs to learn the mechanism of ASEAN co-operation, and for their part, some ASEAN members might not want to see Vietnam do so”.1 Thus for the first year Vietnam did indeed maintain a low profile. Staff was being trained in English, and in the structures and processes of ASEAN. At the same time, as we shall see, Vietnamese participants in ASEAN seemed to be learning a great deal as well about its political dynamics. Meanwhile, Vietnam needed to deal with its mammoth neighbour one on one, which was the way China preferred. On the surface it appeared that relations were improving. Rail links were re-established in early 1996, while in June Premier Li Peng attended the Eighth Vietnam Communist Party Congress in Hanoi, the highest-ranked Chinese leader to do so in more than thirty years. Ten rounds of negotiations on border disputes were held, but without any agreements. As Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam said in an interview, “We strive to accelerate all existing ties with China. These ties have created benefits for both countries… Some issues, however, still remain unsolved …”.2 In any case, trade in 1996 reached US$l billion. Military exchanges continued with a group of Chinese officers, including the commander of the PLA Navy Air Force, visiting Vietnam — as well as Malaysia and Singapore — in late February 1997.3 In 019 AR Ch 19 22/9/03, 12:41 PM 97 98 David Wurfel By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville April a Vietnamese military delegation was received in Beijing by the Chinese Defence Minister, who in his welcome speech said, “The two countries share a common belief and common goals, and both are faced with the challenge of securing peace and development ”.4 There seemed to be some attempt to sustain ideological ties. Other aspects of the relationship were entirely devoid of ideological overtones. To counter a similar tactic used earlier by China, in April 1996 Vietnam awarded a contract for oil exploration in the South China Sea to Conoco — in an area also claimed by China — which China protested. But no drilling has been undertaken. Less than a year later China undertook bolder steps, commencing exploratory drilling on the Vietnamese continental shelf less than sixty-five nautical miles from Vietnam’s coast, in an area not covered by claims of any other ASEAN members (and thus designed to antagonize them less). This was despite an October 1993 agreement between the two powers, which said that “while negotiating to settle the [territorial] issues, the two sides shall not conduct activities that may further complicate the disputes”.5 The oil rig began drilling, according to Vietnamese authorities, on 7 March. Vietnam unsuccessfully tried quiet diplomacy before going public with its protest nearly two weeks later. An unnamed official in Hanoi used uncharacteristically strong words: “This action has added another example that the Chinese expansionist policy has remained unchanged ”.6 The diplomatic note handed to the Chinese ambassador merely said: “This act of violation runs counter to the good trend in which bilateral relations of friendship and cooperation are developing ”.7 Vietnam insisted that China withdraw the rig and discuss the disputed maritime claims. On 7 April it was announced that the rig had been withdrawn ; discussions on the claims began in Beijing two days later. The Vietnamese press, however, barely mentioned this apparent diplomatic victory. There was a reason for their reticence; they had boldly played the ASEAN...