-
15. Intra-ASEAN Political, Security and Economic Co-operation
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
Intra-ASEAN Political, Security and Economic Co-operation 75 15. INTRA-ASEAN POLITICAL, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION CHAN HENG CHEE Reprinted in abridged form from Chan Heng Chee, “ASEAN: Sub-Regional Resilience”, in Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region, edited by James W. Morley (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1986), pp. 111–43, by permission of the author and Lexington Books. BILATERAL POLITICAL COOPERATION The emergence of ASEAN as a political community in the course of the dramatic maneuvers over Cambodia has tended to overshadow the more substantial progress achieved in bilateral political cooperation among the five partners. Since 1967, assiduous efforts have been directed toward structuring procedures and formalizing processes to resolve contentious issues among themselves. To a large extent, traditional animosities have receded and bilateral difficulties have been contained and resolved by invoking the ASEAN “spirit.” It would not be an exaggeration to say that in the present ASEAN political ambience, it is difficult to conceive of any two or more members resorting to the use of physical force as a means to solve a problem. The most remarkable improvement in relations occurred between Singapore and Malaysia. Since the dark, grim days of separation, the historically difficult relationship has taken a more cordial turn, based increasingly on pragmatic , functional ties. In 1980, the two governments agreed in principle to set up an intergovernmental committee (IGC), directly responsible to both prime ministers, to increase the level and quality of cooperation between the two countries.1 The aim was also to prevent minor problems from being exaggerated beyond control by adverse publicity and to prevent such issues from reaching the stage of intractability. It is under the Mahathir government, however, that Singapore-Malaysia cooperation moved to a new plane. Recognizing that “an unhappy Singapore can be destabilizing to Malaysia” and that “likewise, discontent in Malaysia can affect Singapore,”2 Mahathir, in his first visit as prime minister, swiftly settled many outstanding bilateral issues with his Singapore counterpart. As a barometer of the newfound trust, Malaysia for the first time allowed Singapore access to training in the Kota Tinggi Jungle Warfare School. Friction between Malaysia and Thailand has perennially erupted over security 76 Chan Heng Chee cooperation on the Thai-Malaysian border because of the lack of common agreement on who constitutes the common enemy. Thai suspicions that their Malaysian ally is not interested in the suppression of the Muslim separatists operating in the south — indeed, that Malaysia may even be secretly succoring their cause — is matched by Malaysian concern that Thai effort in the containment of communist insurgents is ineffective.3 Occasionally, an open outburst of frustration such as that expressed by leading Thai security personnel — Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, General Saiyud Kerdphol, Minister of Interior Sitthi Jirarote, and Lt. General Harn Leenanond, Commander of the Fourth Army Region (in the south) — that the Thai-Malaysian General Border Committee meeting in August 1982 was “unsatisfactory” creates the impression of crisis in bilateral relations; but political leaders have been swift to reaffirm close bilateral ties by immediate consultation to iron out differences. In seeking to control subversion in the south, Malaysia and Thailand are fully aware of the interdependence of security efforts. Both countries have agreed to look into the development of the Golok Basin along the common border to underpin security. Although a new start in MalaysianPhilippines cooperation was promised when President Marcos dramatically renounced the Philippine claim to Sabah at the 1977 ASEAN heads of government meeting in Kuala Lumpur, nothing developed from that statement. The Philippines legislature is yet to legalize its president’s offer. In 1981, accusations surfaced that Muslim separatists were allowed to operate from Sabah and that the eastern state of Malaysia was a source of arms flow to the rebels, leading some Philippine assemblymen to argue for a reactivation of the Sabah claim. In reaction, some Sabah pressure was put on the federal government to break diplomatic ties. That the issue did not blow up was due in no small part to the efforts of the Malaysian prime minister, Dr. Mahathir, to actively defuse the issue. There is every indication that the Philippine willingness to formalize the renunciation is tied to a Malaysian agreement on a border patrol pact, which would stem the arms flow from Sabah to the Muslim separatists in the Mindanao-Sulu region.4 Although the Sabah claim survives as an irritant in Malaysian-Philippine relations, it does not seem to stand in the way of overall...