-
13. Intramural Challenges to the "ASEAN Way"
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
62 Jürgen Haacke By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 13. INTRAMURAL CHALLENGES TO THE “ASEAN WAY” JÜRGEN HAACKE Reprinted in abridged form from Jürgen Haacke, “The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the ‘ASEAN Way’ ”, Pacific Review 12, no. 4 (1999): 581– 611, by permission of the author and Taylor and Francis Limited . THE ‘ASEAN WAY’: SAVED BY AL GORE? At the pre-APEC Business Summit organized in Kuala Lumpur in November 1998 the American Vice-President repeated the standard argument that democracy is the key foundation of prosperity because investors put their money and their faith in democracy . Implicitly, Al Gore also contended, however, that anti-government protests in Malaysia, which he seemed to endorse, were occurring because the Malaysian government had been unable — by virtue of its authoritarian nature — to end the economic suffering of the Malaysian people. Littered as it was with pinpricks directed at Dr Mahathir’s government, Al Gore’s speech was received with outrage, even fury, by Malaysian leaders. For example, then Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi accused the US administration of attempting to incite Malaysians to riot in order to topple the government. Al Gore aroused not merely the anger of those whom he clearly meant to offend, however. He inadvertently also sparked off a nationalist reaction among many of those Malaysians who had hitherto essentially remained part of the country’s silent majority in the context of the struggle by advocates of reformasi against the Mahathir camp (Devan 1998). And more significantly still for our purposes, Al Gore’s speech also induced ASEAN leaders to again rally around the ‘ASEAN way’. There are at least three reasons why this should have happened. First, the US Vice-President overstepped an important psychological benchmark set by ASEAN leaders to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable behaviour by an outside power toward one of their members . Even ASEAN leaders critical of Dr Mahathir agreed that Al Gore’s remarks had demonstrated (again) a measure of disrespect on the part of the US as regards the political and cultural sensitivities of an 013 AR Ch 13 22/9/03, 12:40 PM 62 Intramural Challenges to the “ASEAN Way” 63 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville ASEAN member government. Second, Gore’s speech highlighted not only the continued emphasis on democracy promotion as a key element of American foreign policy, but also conveyed the impression that the United States remained interested in exporting to Southeast Asia a particular model of liberal democracy. This interest is to some extent at odds with the focus on good governance within the region. Third, the Vice-President could be interpreted as having issued a warning that unless regional governments allowed for political change and greater openness, there was a distinct possibility that international (American) investors would turn their backs on crisis-stricken East Asia. The substance and the circumstances of the Gore speech suggested that the particular form of enhanced interaction practised by members was beginning to affect the way in which external powers interacted with ASEAN members. Beyond the issue of respect, Al Gore’s remarks appear to have given rise to concerns that enhanced interaction, if in breach of the principle of quiet diplomacy, might greatly increase ASEAN members’ insecurity and terminate ASEAN’s quest for recognition as a major player in regional international society. Consequently, what was at least an implicit consensus emerged whereby public expressions of enhanced interaction should at least temporarily be put on hold by member states. The sense of urgency to stop ASEAN’s slide into political irrelevance and poor standing in international society was only reinforced by the imminence of the Association’s Sixth Summit in Hanoi in December 1998. As chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee it was incumbent upon Singapore to forge a consensus on what ASEAN should do to offset increasingly widespread perceptions of ASEAN corporate decline and ineffectiveness. In order to restore ASEAN ‘credibility’, Singapore advocated that ASEAN leaders demonstrate their united resolve to address some of the root causes for the financial and economic crisis. In practical terms, Singapore argued that ASEAN countries should press ahead with the liberalization of trade and the opening up of their economies to international investments. Singapore also strongly supported the idea of greater ASEAN transparency in relation to its members’ economic and financial data...