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22 Muthiah Alagappa 5. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK Recommendations for Change MUTHIAH ALAGAPPA Reprinted in abridged form from Muthiah Alagappa, “Asean Institutional Framework and Modus Operandi: Recommendations for Change”, in ASEAN at the Crossroads: Obstacles, Options and Opportunities in Economic Cooperation, edited by Noordin Sopiee, Chew Lay See, Lim Siang Jin (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1987), pp. 183–230, by permission of the author and the publisher. The gradual and piecemeal development of the Asean institutional framework and the emphasis on the consensus method for decision-making clearly reflects the cautious approach of the member governments to regional co-operation, which has so far been mainly political. In terms of structure and process, the preference has been for a loose framework with negotiations characterising activities at all levels. The loose framework and the consensus method have been posited by some practitioners and observers as positive attributes because of their inherent potential to prevent confrontation and development of intra-associational groups or factions. The loose framework, although making for ambiguity and inefficiency, provides opportunities for ‘face saving’ which is considered vital for Asean solidarity and cohesion. The numerous bilateral meetings, especially among the Asean heads of state, are viewed as providing the necessary flexibility to allow discussion of sensitive issues outside the formal framework without undermining Asean harmony. The disparate nature of national governments in the region and the strength of nationalist forces in member countries are also deemed to favour a decentralised Asean machinery. The thrust of this approach is that a well-delineated and endowed institutional framework with authoritative procedures is not in harmony with the Asean spirit. Caution should therefore be exercised in advocating changes to strengthen the Asean machinery. It has, however, also been argued by others that the present Asean machinery and modus operandi suffers a number of shortcomings which must be resolved if Asean cooperation is not to be hampered. The short-comings identified include the following: • Lack of an integrated decision-making structure. Apart from providing political direction, the Asean summit characterised by a high degree of protocol and symbolism, has no specific role in the management of Asean co-operation. Consequently the AMM and AEMM Institutional Framework: Recommendations for Change 23 have emerged as the two key organs of Asean; but unfortunately the vertical line of responsibility that has evolved has dichotomised the decision-making structure creating problems of coordination that seem to erode and debilitate the entire machinery. This situation is further aggravated by the emergence of other parallel meetings among several other categories of Asean ministers. (For details of these problems of co-ordination see C P F Luhulima’s paper on ‘Asean institutions and modus operandi: Looking back and looking forward’). • Application of the consensus method to all issues and levels. While the consensus method certainly has its merits and is perhaps the only acceptable method at the highest levels and on major policy issues, it is also a fact that the application of this method to all levels and issues has considerably reduced the effectiveness of intra-Asean co-operation even in areas where agreement has been reached at policy level. The need for consensus has also prevented the association from co-operating in areas which may have been beneficial to a substantial number (though not all) of its members. • The principle of rotation, so heavily emphasised in Asean, has resulted in a machinery that is cumbersome, inefficient and lacking in continuity and expertise. In particular, this has had a debilitating effect on the development and efficiency of the Asean Secretariat. The rotation system relies heavily on the system of national secretariats and creates an Asean network in which the Asean Secretariat is an ineffective outpost as opposed to being the focal point. • The Asean structure reflects the dominant emphasis on national interests and national representation. There is no provision for representation of the Asean ‘community interest’. This lopsided emphasis on national representation and national gain partly accounts for the very slow development in intra-Asean co-operation. The homebased staff system adopted in staffing the Asean secretariat is a reflection of the emphasis on national representation and one of the reasons underlying the ineffectiveness of the Asean Secretariat. • The Asean system as a whole suffers from institutional and procedural deficiencies . It also lacks the staff to carry out policy research and advisory functions for the various decision-making bodies; monitoring and implementation functions in relation to accepted policies; and the servicing function for the numerous meetings...

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