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Introduction
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville Introduction 471 INTRODUCTION Sharon Siddique What type of institution will ASEAN become? It is clear that, over the past three decades, ASEAN has insisted on the principle of organic growth. ASEAN leaders have resisted following a model. They have repeatedly stated that ASEAN will not be a Southeast Asian EU. And there is little reason to assume that this will change in the near future. It will retain its Southeast Asian character. Some directions have been established. For one, there is an aversion to the creation of an ASEAN-crat bureaucracy that would take on a life of its own, or become more than the sum of its parts. Rather, the ASEAN model has seen the proliferation of meetings and committees and study groups composed of member-state bureaucrats coming together to forge an ASEAN perspective on such diverse topics as health care and tariff reduction. ASEAN states appear to be content with incremental strengthening of the ASEAN Secretariat, a process that was set in motion in 1992. This incremental strengthening is sectoral and targetspecific — for example, the creation of an ASEAN Security Community or an ASEAN Economic Community. These recently conceived visions illustrate another key feature of how ASEAN organizes itself. First a goal is set, and subsequently, the mechanisms and initiatives necessary to achieve the goal are put in place. An illustration of this was the formulation of the goal to achieve an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). When it was first mooted, it was also known by another AFTA acronym — Act first, Talk after. If ASEAN is not destined to evolve into anything more than the sum of its parts (its ten nation-state members), this begs the question of what sort of regional identity it will acquire. The dynamics of an internal regional identity are quite different from the external ASEAN face that is presented to the outside world. Differences can be much more easily downplayed. The policy of noninterference in the affairs of other member states is deeply ingrained in the ASEAN psyche, and national sovereignty is carefully guarded. But in order to achieve the goal of the ASEAN Vision 2020, the issue of the limits of national sovereignty will eventually have to be addressed. It must also be said that the evolution of an ASEAN identity has been both retarded and enhanced by the expansion from ASEAN-6 to ASEAN-10. It has been retarded because of the diverse political and economic systems that must be accommodated. Levelling the disparities in economic prosperity between Singapore 094 AR Section VIII 22/9/03, 1:00 PM 471 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 472 Introduction and Laos, for example, will be challenging, and a common identity must rest in part on some sort of economic parity. But the evolution of an ASEAN identity has also been enhanced because for the first time the entire geographic spread of the Southeast Asian region is encompassed in one organization. This lends a certain legitimacy to the evolution of a truly ASEAN identity, which can encompass all the rich diversity of Southeast Asia’s multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious heritage. Some scholars have argued that regional economic development will be the glue that binds the member states. During the euphoric years of double-digit growth, there was a belief that the region could soon graduate into the developed world, with all the attendant rewards associated with success. ASEAN’s “prosper thy neighbour” approach worked very well until the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Many bold initiatives were undertaken, not least of which was AFTA. ASEAN is still struggling with AFTA, but now there is a renewed emphasis on the need for an even more ambitious ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Certainly ASEAN enlargement has made the whole question of the AEC more complex, as has the issue of free labour migration across borders — even among the original ASEAN-6. The urgency to formulate the goal of an ASEAN Security Community appears to be propelled more by external factors than an internal desire for intra-ASEAN cross-border security co-operation. ASEAN needs to articulate a cogently formulated role in the larger, emerging Asian security region, if it is to remain a relevant player in the changing global security equation. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been an instructive dialogue and confidencebuilding body. The question now...