The 2nd ASEAN Reader

90. The ASEAN-10 and Japan

450 Takano Takeshi By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 90. THE ASEAN-10 AND JAPAN TAKANO TAKESHI Reprinted in abridged form from Takano Takeshi, “The ASEAN-10 and Regional Political Relations”, in Road to ASEAN-10: Japanese Perspectives on Economic Integration, edited by Sekiguchi Sueo and Noda Makito (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange; and Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 16–36, by permission of the author and the Japan Center for International Exchange. Areform-oriented China should be wel comed not only by ASEAN but also by Japan. If, as Hans Maull puts it, “reconciling China with international order represents the biggest political challenge that the world is facing today” (1997, 466), then engaging China in regional as well as international affairs peacefully and incrementally benefits enormously both ASEAN and Japan. Both must take the lead in engaging China with the world, thereby building stable and constructive relationships not only in the bilateral context but also among all the Asia Pacific nations. China is now well integrated into the security structures of the Asia Pacific region. Without China’s participation, no major decision can be made regarding the future course of events in the region. In this respect, it is necessary to view Japan’s role in an enlarged ASEAN in the much broader context of regional affairs. Moreover, Japan’s relations with the United States — and the problems between the two — have significant implications for ASEAN and its enlargement because the security arrangements between the two countries are the keystone in the Pacific, especially after the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines. Japan now faces a difficult situation. With the economic downturn, Japan needs a new paradigm of national life. Relations among economic, political, bureaucratic, and social institutions, once thriving, have been structurally strained and are virtually on the verge of collapse. Therefore, Japan must recognize that coexistence and sharing the fruits of prosperity with neighboring countries are the keys to its revival. Meanwhile, Tokyo must eventually deal with the “Okinawa question” and the reduction of the U.S. military facilities there. Moreover, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty itself — its reinforcement and the scope of its application — may prove to be a big source of concern for Beijing. The treaty could produce distrust or even outright 090 AR Ch 90 22/9/03, 12:59 PM 450 The ASEAN-10 and Japan 451 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville hostility in Beijing. However, looking at the politics and security of the region as a whole, it is clear that some positive developments have emerged for Japan. By contributing to ASEAN-led preventive diplomacy — despite shortcomings yet to be overcome — Japan will certainly win over the diverse members of ARF to promote mutual understanding on regional security. A successful formulation of the doctrine could even help Japan fulfill its aspiration for reform of the U.N. Security Council. In the coming new century, the ASEAN10 could become an experimental field — or possibly even a breakthrough — for Japan’s diplomacy, which so far has been used mainly to extend financial and technical assistance to developing nations. Japan’s participation in ARF causes little concern with regard to its determination to play a more active role in regional security. Together with ASEAN, Japan can allay the fears of its neighbors, even China and South Korea, which are also members of ARF. Meanwhile, a continued constructive engagement approach toward some of the regional states, especially Myanmar and Cambodia, is essential. Japan, though it basically follows ASEAN’s policies, has its own position in dealing with these countries. For example, Tokyo decided in 1998 to resume financial assistance to Yangon after ten years of suspension. Financial assistance of approximately US$20 million will be extended to Myanmar, criticism from inside and outside Japan notwithstanding. The financing is intended for repairs to the Yangon international airport to ensure safety and to bring it up to International Commercial Aviation Organization standards. The airport is antiquated , and the Japanese government once promised to have it repaired before suspending official aid in 1988. Japan’s decision invited criticism from Washington, but Foreign Ministry officials in Tokyo today seem to exhibit a strong defiance toward the inconsistencies and double standards the United States applies to issues concerning human rights. Although the impact of the aid might be small, it surely provides Japan with more possibilities to...