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86. ASEAN’s Role in the Chinese Foreign Policy Framework
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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430 Joseph Y. S. Cheng By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville 86. ASEAN’S ROLE IN THE CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORK JOSEPH Y. S. CHENG Reprinted in abridged form from Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Sino-ASEAN Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. 3 (2001): 420–51, by permission of the author and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. In an era of economic reforms and its opening up to the external world, China wants to secure a peaceful international environment to concentrate on economic development. Its strategy in the Asia-Pacific region has been consistent: to stabilize China’s periphery, and treat the region as China’s base. Chinese leaders accept that regional cooperation is an irreversible trend in global economic development and in the evolution of the contemporary international power configuration. As the largest developing country in the Asia-Pacific region, China has to participate and promote regional economic co-operation enthusiastically in order to strengthen its influence in the region. This activism since the 1990s has been in sharp contrast to the aloofness and lack of a regional policy in the 1970s. The Chinese authorities understand that only through active participation, will China be able to benefit from the regional economic cooperation process, and direct the flows of capital, technology, and commodities in directions favourable to China’s development . They certainly hope to influence the orientation and development of the organizations for regional co-operation, and at the same time enhance China’s position to oppose hostile blocs and organizations. It has been with such intentions that China has participated in the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC), ASEAN Regional Forum, and so on. In the past two decades or so, China and the countries of Southeast Asia have been concentrating on strengthening their economic base. In their pursuit of economic development and prosperity, economic linkages between them in the areas of trade, investment, finance, and technology have been strengthening. At the same time, China and ASEAN share very similar stands on issues such as Asian values. The discourse on Asian values emerged in the early 1990s, articulated most prominently by the then Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of 086 AR Ch 86 22/9/03, 12:58 PM 430 ASEAN’s Role in the Chinese Foreign Policy Framework 431 By: ROS Size: 7.5" x 10.25" J/No: 03-14474 Fonts: New Baskerville Malaysia.1 They argued that the ethical foundations of Asian societies rest on values that emphasize consensus and harmony, loyalty to family and community, hierarchy and deference to authority, as opposed to Western ideals which stress individual rights, civil liberties, and competitive politics. The consensus on Asian values between China and ASEAN was best symbolized by the Bangkok Declaration, which embodied their agreement on the common human rights position to be articulated at the World Conference on Human Rights, held in June 1993 in Vienna. The Bangkok Declaration emphasized economic growth, community interests, non-interference in other countries ’ domestic affairs, and respect for each other’s different socio-economic, historical, and cultural backgrounds.2 The Chinese leadership and China’s Southeast Asian experts are aware that serious problems face the development of Sino-ASEAN relations in the future. They acknowledge that the regional dynamics among the ASEAN states still take priority over their relations with China. For example, Singapore had to wait for Indonesia to normalize relations with China before doing so itself. In fact, in the eyes of the ASEAN states, China does not have to cultivate close ties with them. Its economic integration with Hong Kong and Taiwan may create a trading group in keen competition with ASEAN. These considerations, however, do not seem to have eroded the Chinese leadership’s determination and optimism in developing better relations with the ASEAN states. Such optimism admittedly may well lead to an underestimation of the potential problems and obstacles. In the early 1990s, when China was attempting to improve relations with its neighbours, to ensure that it would enjoy a peaceful international environment, the ASEAN states were also considering how to meet the challenge of integrating China into the Asia-Pacific community by offering it a reasonable stake and a constructive role in the region. In this mutual engagement process, both parties broadened their respective concepts of security to include not only the military, but...