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This chapter records the involvement of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) in Indonesian politics from the late 1950s through to today. The army faces a number of dilemmas relating to its future, including its political role and its relationship with the executive arm of government. This chapter traces the evolution of the military’s role in Indonesian politics; follows the rise of President Soeharto and his system of promotions and demotions of high-ranking officers; and covers the rise and fall of leadership groups within the Indonesian armed forces. THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE TNI IN THE POLITICAL ‘MIRE’ The TNI’s involvement in Indonesian politics dates back to the late 1950s and has its origins in three key events. The first was the speech in 1958 by army chief-of-staff (Kasad) Major-General A.H. Nasution, which outlined his view that the armed forces should pursue a ‘middle way’between the poles of Latin American military dictatorship and Western military political passiveness. The second was the nationalisation of Dutch companies in 1957, which resulted in a number of army officers taking up key economic and business positions. Officers who became active in economic fields, such as Colonel Dr Ibnu Sutowo and Major Suhardiman, played an increasingly non-military role. The effect was two-fold: it prevented communists from seizing strategic positions in the economic and business fields, thus providing a means to prevent communist infiltration of labour movements; and it allowed army-controlled businesses such as Pertamina, the national oil company managed by Ibnu Sutowo, to become important sources of finance for the TNI. A third and final element was President Sukarno’s decision to restore the 1945 Constitution on 5 July 1959, and to appoint several military officers as 11 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GENERALS: THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AT A CROSSROADS Atmadji Sumarkidjo 136 AA/Part2 23/3/01 6:25 PM Page 136 ministers in his working cabinet formed on 10 July 1959. By 1960 the TNI found itself holding some of the most powerful political and non-military positions in Indonesia. Moreover, as both Secretary of Defence and Kasad, Nasution was established as the second most powerful man in Indonesia after the president. Nasution then worked to strengthen his position within the TNI as well as at the broader national political level. His first move towards institutionalising his power was to ensure the loyalty of the officers’ corps, the majority of whom, like Nasution, shared a solidarity and cohesiveness based on their experiences during the Indonesian revolutionary period. Nasution promoted many to important positions at the level of general staff in Jakarta. Having consolidated his position, he eventually appointed Lieutenant-General Gatot Soebroto to replace him as Kasad in 1963. Following the death of Soebroto, Major-General Achmad Yani was appointed as Kasad. Nasution removed former comrades-in-arms who disagreed with him, such as Colonels Ahmad Husein, Dahlan Djambek, Simbolon and Zulkifli Lubis. In some cases this backfired, as many went on to lead rebellions against Jakarta: Somba, Ventje Sumual and Runturambi, for instance, went on to lead the PRRI rebellion in North Sulawesi. Their replacements were loyal to Nasution, notable among them being Colonel Achmad Jani, who (ironically ) ran the successful military operation against the rebellions in Sumatra and North Sulawesi. Not only did Nasution shore up support among the officer corps but, by opening up various business positions, he created a pool of people who felt ‘indebted’ to him politically and financially. Nasution enlarged and broadened the armed forces’ organisational structure so as to ‘take good care’of more officers. In addition, after being promoted to the rank of general, Nasution was able to create a host of new officer ranks ranging from lieutenant to brigadier-general. THE RISE OF SOEHARTO On the night of 30 September 1965, members of the military – notably from the Diponegoro Division – and civilian members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) launched an attempted coup. In the confusion, Major-General Soeharto of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) took command of the army (one of the three branches of the armed forces – army, navy and airforce). Concluding that the coup attempt had been a PKI plot, he manoeuvred to eradicate communist supporters from the army and wider political and social circles. During his early days in power, Soeharto relied heavily on his staff at Kostrad, especially Major-General Umar Wirahadikusumah, Colonel THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GENERALS 137 AA/Part2 23/3/01 6:25...

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