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When Abdurrahman Wahid took office as Indonesia’s fourth president in October 1999, many hoped that the country’s first democratically elected leader would show the way to long overdue institutional reform of the political system. Abdurrahman won the presidential race as a compromise candidate , with representatives from most political forces joining what soon was to be called the ‘cabinet of national unity’. The international community, after initial irritation caused by Megawati Sukarnoputri’s failure to gain the presidency , pledged support for the new administration, hoping that Indonesia would return to political normality and ultimately achieve economic consolidation . Those observers who had closely followed events leading to Abdurrahman ’s election were more pessimistic, however. Abdurrahman’s obsession with becoming Habibie’s successor forced him to alienate former allies and make false promises to previous enemies, and was a shaky platform from which the country had to embark on its historic journey of political reform. The highly heterogeneous composition of the cabinet and the unpredictability of its leader were unlikely to guarantee the political stability Indonesia needed to restructure its political framework. The facade of political harmony in late October 1999 disintegrated within a month. By then, the first minister had been sacked, with six more to follow before the formation of a new cabinet in August 2000. The challenges that the Abdurrahman administration faced were enormous . The project of fundamentally reforming the country’s political structure covered six main areas. First, the institutional framework of the political system had to be redefined and modernised. Since the 1950s, the state institutions had been manipulated by a succession of authoritarian regimes, using the ambiguity of the 1945 Constitution to legalise their grip on power. As a result, the institutional relations between the presidency, parliament (the People’s Representative Council, or DPR) and the People’s Consultative Assembly 29 3 ABDURRAHMAN’S INDONESIA: POLITICAL CONFLICT AND INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS Marcus Mietzner* AA/Part1 23/3/01 6:24 PM Page 29 (MPR) were shrouded in legal uncertainty, leaving constitutional experts wondering if Indonesia adhered to a presidential or a parliamentary system, or a chaotic mixture of both. If Indonesia wanted to institutionalise its democratisation process, the constitutional framework had to be reformed by a coordinated effort to draft a blueprint for the relations between the state institutions, and an action plan to implement it by changing the constitution as well as related laws and government regulations. A second issue related to the codification of relations between the centre and the regions, incorporating detailed arrangements for financial and political autonomy regulated by government decrees. Local governments all over the archipelago expected clarification about how the new autonomy laws would affect their home regions. Third, the Indonesian National Army (TNI) had to be contained by a strong institutional control mechanism, reducing its influence on politics and convincing it to concentrate on defence matters rather than internal security. At the same time, however, its institutional unity and instrumental efficiency had to be guarded, as the fragmentation of the TNI would pose a greater danger to further democratisation than its push for continued political power. The fourth point was that Indonesia’s notoriously corrupt legal system had to be cleaned up. The corruption of New Order judges still posed a serious threat to the restoration of international confidence in Indonesia’s economic and political stability. A fifth area of concern was the development of political parties as the foundation for the future democratic system. The Guided Democracy and New Order regimes had emasculated Indonesia’s political parties since the late 1950s, making it difficult for the post-Soeharto administration to rely on a strong network of political parties. Finally, the new administration shouldered huge expectations from the Indonesian people to facilitate the recovery of the economy. With Indonesia experiencing its third year of continued economic crisis, many observers predicted things would get better as soon as a democratically elected government was put in charge. After one year in office, little progress has been made in the six sectors mentioned above. The reasons for this are manifold. The first is that the decades-long political stagnation under the New Order permeated the postSoeharto political elite more than initially hoped. Corruption, misuse of political office for personal interests, neglect of public accountability – all these features of the New Order administration have become part of a political culture resistant to structural change. Second, the deep divisions within the political elite have led to the subordination of the reform project to the...

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