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The appropriation and modification of the “soviet model” of Collectivization: The Case of hungary1 zsuzsAnnA vArgA as Cold War conflict intensified toward the end of the 1940s, the efforts to sovietize Central and eastern europe were accelerated, resulting in the large-scale implementation of the stalinist social, political, and economic model.2 Despite key differences in the timing and the methods applied in each country, the supremacy of this model was not disputed until stalin’s death.3 although criticism of stalinism first surfaced after his death in 1953, the actual turning point was the Twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the soviet union in february 1956, when Khrushchev delivered his landmark speech denouncing the cult of stalinism.4 The resolutions adopted by soviet party leaders acknowledged the possibility that each country may find its own way to socialism, according to its own special national characteristics . This statement contained an inherent criticism of the dominance of the soviet model as it was applied across the eastern Bloc. 1 i would especially like to thank arnd Bauerkämper and Constantin iordachi for their helpful editorial comments made on earlier versions of this paper. my paper was supported by the János Bolyai research scholarship of the hungarian academy of sciences. 2 for more on this period in english, see Berend, Central and Eastern Europe; Crampton, Eastern Europe; pittaway, Eastern Europe 1939–2000; swain and swain, Eastern. 3 on the issue of the existence of the soviet model, i agree with nigel swain’s interpretation: until stalin’s death the soviet model was a stalinist model. however, after 1953 this model changed, it became a “moving target,” a changing set of features, due to the Khrushchev’s reforms. 4 fejtő, A népi demokráciák, 46–56. 434 ZSUZSANNA VARGA Both the polish october and the hungarian revolution of 1956 had a serious impact on relations between the soviet union and its satellites, causing a genuine shock to the socialist system.5 stalinist leaders expressed sharp criticism of the policy of de-stalinization and of the attempts at liberalization that followed. The Chinese leadership, who resented the preeminence of the soviet union, was concerned that this development would lead to the weakening of the Communist party’s authority in eastern europe. in this tense situation, it was essential for Khrushchev to reconfirm the support of eastern european communist parties. The Congress of Communist and Workers’ parties in november 1957 provided an ideal opportunity to restore unity and stability to the socialist Bloc. The resolution adopted there reflected the endurance of moscow’s dogmatic policy—the most obvious sign of which was the party’s decision to resume its controversial collectivization program in eastern european countries.6 The renewal of this program followed earlier, deeply problematic attempts to implement the program as part of sovietization at the beginning of the 1950s. Those early campaigns were only partially achieved, and often resulted in severe economic crises and social tensions due to falling food production and problems with the supply chain.7 nigel swain has identified four different paths of collectivization and socialist agriculture in the soviet-dominated Central and eastern europe: 1) states where the program was abandoned (poland and Yugoslavia); 2) states which adapted stalinist model (romania and albania); 3) states following a “neo-stalinist” program (Czechoslovakia, the gDr, and Bulgaria ); 4) and the hungarian case, which constitutes a path of its own.8 in this volume, József Ö. Kovács examines all three stages of forced collectivization in hungary (1949–53, 1955–56, and 1959–61), laying the 5 fejtő, A népi demokráciák, 112–26. 6 The moscow declaration contained only general ideological guidelines with no direct instructions as to the acceleration of collectivization. The elimination of capitalist property and placing main means of production under public ownership and a gradual socialist transformation of agriculture were common guidelines of the “building of socialism.” Concerning proprietorship the formulation was clear: the fact that the countryside had not yet fully adopted social conditions was a major obstacle in the “building of socialism.” The inequalities between industry and agriculture, between towns and countryside, were deemed very harmful and were to be eliminated as soon as possible. see Az emberiség békéjéért, 1957, 22–24. 7 on early collectivization campaigns, see swain’s contribution to this volume. 8 swain, “Decollectivization politics.” see also his contribution to this volume. [3.136.154.103] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 02...

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