The Lost Generation: The Rustication of China’s Educated Youth (1968–1980)

Conclusion

Conclusion Economic Program or Political Movement? Massive post–Cultural Revolution xiaxiang as a “movement” with political and ideological objectives specifically related to the history of the CCP and Mao’s person did not have the “rationality” that some economists and political scientists conferred on it in the 1970s. It would be wrong, I believe, to want to rationalize regimes that assert nonutilitarian motives and reduce their ideological objectives to mere irrelevant facades. We know that even some highranking Nazis did not understand or accept Hitler’s irrational, anti-utilitarian emphasis on the ideological objective of exterminating Jews, often regardless of the regime’s economic and military interests.1 Reducing the desire for extermination to mere material interests would be missing a vital aspect. Similarly, in the case of xiaxiang, stressing the economic motives and forgetting the political ones, especially the fact that the zhiqing were rusticated in order to be reeducated (and not, for instance, to become “a new rural elite” functionally comparable to the literati who returned to their villages in former 1 See Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 342. THE LOST GENERATION_FA02_17June2013.indd 441 THE LOST GENERATION_FA02_17June2013.indd 441 19/6/13 3:14 PM 19/6/13 3:14 PM 442 | THE LOST GENERATION times),2 would be to make a very unfortunate selective reading of official discourse. It must be recognized, however, that the confusion regarding the importance of the various factors at play may be explained by the seeming continuity with the pre–Cultural Revolution movement, when economic motives, such as employment and the cost of education, dominated. As we have seen, those motives persisted after 1968, at least in the minds of some of the leaders. But xiaxiang was not the only possible solution to these problems and only appeared rational within a certain development logic that, while outwardly economic, was basically determined by political and ideological factors. In fact, the first, pre–Cultural Revolution xiaxiang was a result of the CCP’s inability to govern the country according to a rational plan, as it claimed to be doing. In terms of economic development, education, and population movements, the 1950–1960 decade was a succession of feverish periods followed by cooling off ones. The problem of outlets for graduates occurred sporadically during the 1950s. The catastrophic failure of the Great Leap Forward led to a severe economic readjustment, in which the “managers” (notably Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai) convinced themselves of the need to rid the cities of a portion of their young people for a number of years. However, they were unable to obtain the consent of the parties concerned simply by telling them that this sacrifice was necessary to develop a specific economic model. They had to find additional high-minded reasons and moral constraints, which only Maoist ideology could supply. But for Mao, ideology was not a secondary factor, since it was directly related to his power and desire for social transformation. So xiaxiang, launched just when he eliminated (or brought to order) the managers, was clearly governed by a different logic than pre–Cultural Revolution xiaxiang. The ideological and political objectives played a vital role and were inextricably linked to the Great Helmsman ’s prestige, thus conferring a sacred element on them. Of course, economic considerations were not forgotten in the practical application of xiaxiang and they remained a priority for those managers who survived the Cultural Revolution (Zhou Enlai, and later Deng Xiaoping). They attempted to reintroduce their own logic, which led to tensions, but they could not openly challenge the major trends decided by Mao. After his death, when the 2 Here I refer in particular to the article by Chen Pi-chao, “Overurbanization, Rustication of Urban-Educated Youths, and Politics of Rural Transformation.” But many other outside researchers at the time fell into the trap of economism or of idealizing the PRC’s political operating methods. THE LOST GENERATION_FA02_17June2013.indd 442 THE LOST GENERATION_FA02_17June2013.indd 442 19/6/13 3:14 PM 19/6/13 3:14 PM CONCLUSION | 443 managers took up the reins they tried to impose their earlier model of a type of xiaxiang principally driven by economic motivations, but they ran into fierce social resistance. As pragmatists, they understood that the cost of maintaining that policy would far exceed any benefits, and despite the very unfavorable demographic situation, they found other solutions to the urban employment problem by introducing wide...