Ethics Unbound: Chinese and Western Perspectives on Morality

Conclusion

CONCLUSION Morality is integrally connected with the notion of what it means to be a human being. However, this does not imply that the moral path is an easy one. On the contrary, thinkers such as Kant, Confucius, Mencius, and Rousseau assert that it requires unceasing effort and dedication, suggesting that human beings are not part of the world in the same manner as other creatures. According to Confucian thinkers, human beings are continuous with nature, but they must continuously extend and cultivate themselves to ensure that this continuity is nurtured, for it can never be taken for granted. Even though nature is viewed neither as mechanistic nor separate from human beings, it is reflected upon in order that we may participate in the moral order of tian. Confucius is more pessimistic than Mencius about the possibility of attaining the unspoken harmony of nature, because li and the human artifice associated with it are difficult to incorporate into one’s being so that their execution becomes effortless. Mencius, on the other hand, is more confident about the possibility of human harmony with nature, but this may be because he describes a cultivated nature that already bears a strong imprint of human beings. We may feel an affective and natural unity with the ox to be slaughtered or the child that falls in the well, but these sentiments are like scaffolding that must be built upon and purposefully cultivated, so that they go beyond our most immediate environs (M 1A7). The ox or the cicada do not undergo such a process of continuous extension, and do not reflect upon the organic whole of the cosmos. Human beings must actively foster and nurture their consanguinity with nature. This process of reflection, both upon the cosmos and upon one- 228 Ethics Unbound: Chinese and Western Perspectives on Morality self, is where the dangers of morality lurk, according to Daoist thinkers. Zhuangzi does not object to Confucian virtues such as ren and yi in and of themselves, but worries about the danger of their objectification and reification, which turn them into properties to acquire rather than processes that we are to participate in. Although Confucian philosophy never claims that these virtues are attributes to be possessed, from a Daoist perspective this “degeneration” begins when role models are established and when morality is predicated on performance that depends upon public recognition (see DDJ 66). The egotistical self is one that objectifies itself, seeing the self and the world as items for possession, and is often preoccupied with the perception others hold of it. We see ourselves as objects through the eyes of others and, only under their gaze, begin to attempt to acquire an identity for ourselves. Conventional morality can foster such behavior by placing a high premium on proper roles, a social hierarchy, and the image one projects to others. The Daoist sage is therefore a direct foil to the Confucian sage, and undoes the effects of conventional morality because she is to remain inconspicuous, drawing on the potential of human beings, without acting as the shining polestar to which all are drawn. Instead of being a beacon, the sage becomes a translucent mirror who does not have an identity of her own and is hardly noticed at all. Because of this, she is able to draw out the potential of others without imposing her will on them. Neither the Daodejing nor the Zhuangzi imply that we should dispense with the process of reflection; instead, they suggest that we undo or even counterbalance some of its effects by engaging in the meditative processes of forgetting, whereby even our bodily limbs no longer seem to belong to us. This is an exceedingly challenging task because we gradually are to let go of our self-identity. Being invisible in the manner of the sage, and acting in such a way that one is hardly noticed, is a tremendously difficult undertaking. The Confucian moral and extended self is still an agent, while the Daoist sage engaged in wuwei becomes almost agentless. The Daoist virtues such as de and wuwei are meant to be even more amorphous than Confucian ones. If the Confucian is engaged in the cultivation of the self, the Daoist sage participates in the cultivation of the nonself. Once we no longer experience ourselves as Conclusion 229 subjects, eventually morality is no longer necessary because we are completely integrated into the world that...