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General object: federalism – 21 – 7. From purpose to object. If the point of the book is a methodological one, the legal materials to which the methodological considerations are made applicable, are situated in one area, that is federalism. This choice was conscious, in the sense that exploring the problem from the viewpoint of federalism – an area of law traditionally deemed to be closely related to politics – allows us to make our point more saliently. At the same time, I do not exclude that the form of analysis offered here could have a wider impact, on constitutional jurisprudence as a whole. Even so, our current research object remains federalism, and in what follows, I will further explain how this object is to be conceived of. General object: federalism 8. Framing the object. In 1996, John Fitzmaurice considered a question that has become increasingly relevant since the 2007 and 2010 Belgian federal elections, the aftermath of which was constituted by a long and tiresome debate on a new institutional agreement. Even if this Institutional Agreement (coined Butterfly Agreement9 ) has now been reached10 , Fitzmaurice’s question, that is: ‘Whither Belgium?’, has not really lost its relevance. For it is common knowledge amongst those familiar with Belgian politics that every stage of state reforms (partially) germinates the necessity for a subsequent one11 . I refer to Fitzmaurice here, not so much because his question is the focal point of this book, but rather because his answer is illustrative of how we can start to understand federalism. He considered that ‘[o]utcomes will be determined by a complex dialectic between the internal dynamics of Belgian society and the balance between the two main communities and the external political, social 9 In Dutch: Vlinderakkoord; in French: l’accord papillon. The name refers to the bow tie (vlinderdas/noeud papillon, vlinder/papillon being translated as butterfly) commonly worn by Belgium’s current prime minister (and then chief negotiator), Elio Di Rupo. 10 Een efficiëntere Federale Staat en een Grotere Autonomie voor de Deelstaten, Institutioneel akkoord voor de zesde Staatshervorming (Oct. 11, 2011) (hereinafter: Butterfly Agreement). It has even been partially implemented: see for an overview, http://www. law.kuleuven.be/icr/doc_6e_shv. 11 See eg Patricia Popelier & Dave Sinardet, Stabiliteit en instabiliteit in de Belgische federale staatsstructuur in België: QUO VADIS? Waarheen na de zesde staatshervorming? 3, 3 (Patricia Popelier, Dave Sinardet, Jan Velaers & Bea Cantillon eds. 2012) (‘[f]ederal states may be dynamic in nature: they are constantly searching for balance between the federated entities’ autonomy and the coherence of the federal whole […] But these reforms succeed each other much faster in Belgium than elsewhere’). Introduction – 22 – and economic forces that play upon it’12 . Correct as that consideration might be, the dialectic stands in need of some clarification, and this book will attempt to provide some clarification, albeit within specific constraints. 9. Legal analysis of federalism-related questions. These constraints are of particular importance when trying to explain a dialectic between different societal forces and various institutional structures, and the first constraint is rather obvious: I am not examining how Belgian federalism works in general, nor where it is heading towards. Rather, I am dealing with the particular question how Belgian fundamental rules concerning federalism are influenced by the process of ongoing Europeanization. Within this legal perspective, I need to further delimit the scope of my inquiry. 10. Analysis of constitutional court case law on federalism: the last word. First of all, I am not examining the European influence on Belgian legislation as such, or on case law as such. Rather, I primarily focus on the case law of the Constitutional Court in Belgium, which arguably ‘has the final word’13 in federalism matters. A constitutional court indeed generally decides upon modalities of the institutionalization of federalism, in that often measures institutionalizing federalism have been constitutionally enshrined, and constitutional law, in terms of judicial review of legislative measures, is first and foremost safeguarded by a constitutional court. This is at least the case in 12 John Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium: a Unique Federalism 267 (1996). 13 Jan Velaers, De Grondwet en de Raad van State. Afdeling wetgeving 14 (1999). Further compare Popelier & Sinardet, supra note 11, at p. 11, 14-17 (on the importance of the CC as a mechanism of federal coherence); Marc Uyttendaele, Le Fédéralisme inachevé. Réflexions sur le système institutionnele belge, issu des réformes de 1988-1989 p. 530 et seq. (1991) (making a similar point, by construing...

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