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83 love of truth, true love, and the truth about love Ruth Ronen “[o]nly those who have had the courage to work through lacan’s antiphilosophy without faltering deserve to be called ‘contemporary philosophers’” (Badiou, 2006, p. 121). here, alain Badiou refers to lacan as an antiphilosopher due to his radical interpretation of the notion of truth, the truth philosophers love. if lacan is an anti-philosopher, does this mean that psychoanalysis is disengaged from the philosophical commitment to truth? does lacan not love truth? is it the idea that truth can be loved, or is it the way philosophers love their truth that lacan objects to? as Badiou shows, it is not truth that is rejected by lacan; what he counters is the philosophical love that finds its repose in truth, which attaches the love of truth to whatever finds its articulation in philosophical wisdom. lacanian anti-philosophy, then, is a protestation against the philosophical wisdom which focuses too much on the espousing of truth to love. This espousing of truth to love is afforded to philosophy by the shelter of wisdom within which this friendship between love and truth is created and preserved. in other words, what brings about this espousing of truth to love is the philosophical indulgence in a truth bearable to thought, acceptable to philosophical wisdom, and believed to be attainable. and yet lacan’s anti-philosophy does not amount merely to the rejection of the espousal of truth to love; it goes further than that. lacan shows, especially in his reading of Plato’s Symposium, how the philosophical love of truth is enacted in the tempestuous relations of love among the dialogue’s participants. it is through these transferential relations that philosophy claims to love truth, while lacan shows that, in transference, the one holding the position of the psychoanalyst (Socrates) cannot be driven by the love of truth. Psychoanalysis does not replace philosophical love of truth with an alternative notion of truth, but replaces the love of truth with a desire for truth, which is the only position from which the real power of truth can be produced as the effect of transference. Badiou is interested in the fate of the love of truth after lacan as he takes note of the way psychoanalysis reveals that the philosophical wisdom espousing love and truth covers up the true tumultuous relation of the philosophical subject with truth. For the contemporary philosopher to cross Figures_150810.indd 83 22/09/10 10:35 ruth ronen 84 lacan’s anti-philosophy, he/she would need to reconstitute the encounter between philosophical wisdom and the love of truth on different grounds. in this paper, the philosophical love of truth as re-interpreted by Badiou’s contemporary outlook, and the psychoanalytical truth about love, will be weighed against each other through the question of true love and the practice of desire presented in Plato’s Symposium. in the Symposium, love of truth and the truth about love seem to coalesce in the participants’ speeches (whoever succeeds to speak the truth about eros is also the one whose love of truth was not led astray by love). in looking back at lacan’s reading of the Platonic dialogue, we may consider Badiou’s restitution of the philosophical love of truth after lacan in order to pose the following questions: in what way does the contemporary philosopher love truth? can contemporary philosophical wisdom still espouse love and truth? in what way is the philosopher’s love of truth different from the psychoanalyst’s position vis-à-vis truth? in order to address these questions, even if on a very limited scale, Badiou’s notion of truth will first be presented to reveal the one irreducible trait that makes a philosopher: his/her love of truth. For Badiou, to restitute this philosophical passion requires getting over the psychoanalytical idea that truth, when articulated, is necessarily castrated. after lacan, we are left with the sad insight that “truth is the mask of its own weakness … truth is the very veiling of being in its withdrawal” (Badiou, 2006, p. 122), or, to use lacan’s own phrasing in one of his later seminars: “the love of truth is the love of this weakness whose veil we have lifted, it’s the love of what truth hides, which is called castration” (lacan, 2007, p. 52 [58 in French original]). how is philosophical love affected by a truth that has been castrated, withdrawn? here, lacan’s reading...

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