Ancient Perspectives on Aristotle's De anima

God, the Divine, and νοῦς in Relation to the De anima

god, the divine, and νοῦς in relation to the de anima Patrick Macfarlane Ronald Polansky In his treatise on the possibility of prophecy in sleep, Aristotle argues that dreams, while not God-sent, have a special daemonic status resulting from their link to nature: On the whole, forasmuch as certain of the other animals [besides humans ] also dream, it may be concluded that dreams are not sent by God (θεόπεμπτα), nor are they designed for this purpose. They are daemonic (δαιμόνια), however, for nature is daemonic, though not divine (θεία). A sign is this: the power of foreseeing the future and of having vivid dreams is found in persons of inferior type, which implies that God does not send their dreams. (On Divination in Sleep, 463b12-16, Barnes ed. [1984], trans. slightly modified) Were dreams sent by God, counter to Aristotle’s conception of the deity, they might pertain merely to philosophers rather than to thoughtless beasts and ordinary humans.¹ But dreams for Aristotle lack a clear purpose, and are not divine. Yet as resulting from natural causes — perception, φαντασία, and sleep — they are natural, and as natural they are daemonic. What is natural has its own inner principle of rest and motion. Though many natural beings are not self-movers, many are, and since natural beings display startling patterns of change they warrant the epithet daemonic beings.²¹ Some medieval thinkers embrace Aristotle’s notion that prophecy if God-bestowed should belong only to exalted humans (see, e.g., Maimonides Guide for the Perplexed ii 32 and 36). This contrasts with Spinoza Theological-Political Treatise chs. 2-3.² ‘Daemonic’ seems explained by 453b22-24 where it is slightly contrasted with what humans do just on their own. Occurrences due to nature are daemonic because they appear largely self-moving and directed to an end, yet without human intention. Dreams may seem meaningful, but not exactly made by humans as are poems, which are also imitations , produced by us (and therefore not so daemonic). Meaningful dreams especially seem daemonic because they work in a way resembling how nature works. E.g., Aristotle holds open the possibility in On Divination in Sleep 1, 463a3-8 that dreams may be of prognostic value for medical purposes as certain ‘distinguished physicians’ (τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες) believe. This nicely allows him to have dreams as somewhat prophetic, but reasonably as arising naturally from the body. This position resembles that of the Hippocratic writer in On Regimen iv (see van der Eijk [2005], 169-205). Yet any dream significant or not, as due to φαντάσματα that are natural, can be considered daemonic.  patrick macfarlane and ronald polansky The soul should especially be something daemonic, since soul is the very nature of a mortal living being, the principle of its life and self-motion. The De anima aims to keep the investigation of soul as much as possible within the terrain of the science of nature, physics. Right from the start Aristotle says, ‘The knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, above all, to our understanding of nature, for the soul is in some sense the principle of the living beings (τῶν ζῴων)’ (402a4-7).³ It is not only in the De anima that soul is said to belong in whole or in part within physics, for in Parts of Animals I 1 Aristotle asserts the following: What has been said suggests the question, whether it is the whole soul or only some part of it, the consideration of which comes within the province of natural science. Now if it be of the whole soul that this should treat, then there is no place for any other philosophy beside it. For as it belongs in all cases to one and the same science (θεωρία) to deal with correlated subjects — one and the same science, for instance, deals with sensation and with the objects of sense — and as therefore the intelligent soul and the object of intellect, being correlated, must belong to one and the same science, it follows that natural science will have to include everything in its province. But perhaps it is not the whole soul, nor all its parts collectively, that constitutes the source of motion; but there may be one part, identical with that in plants, which is the source of growth, another, namely the sensory part, which is the source of change of quality, while still another, and this not the intellectual part, is the source of locomotion. For other animals than man have the power...