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The russian parliamenT and vladimir puTin’s presidenCy Andrei Zakharov Analysing the Russian political system is at the same time easy and difficult. The problem is easy to solve insofar as the core feature of the Russian political system at present is its mono-subject-ness and, hence, simplicity; the Russian political arena is a one-man stage for a solo performance. In structural terms, Putin’s mono-centrism is much less complicated than was Yeltsin’s. There are currently no political forces in the country that are capable of talking with the President as an equal, and, hence, the political landscape is extremely primitive. At the same time, making this analysis is difficult because the Russian “elective autocracy” can by no means be considered predetermined nor is its bright future ensured. Over the past six years, the voices of those who believe that the political system of Russia is on the threshold of a serious crisis have grown increasingly loud. Sceptics declare that the primary factor of the looming crisis is that the current regime lacks a political alternative. The Yeltsin Regime In order to understand the essence of Vladimir Putin’s regime, it is necessary to describe, at least briefly, Boris Yeltsin’s legacy that Putin inherited. In his effort to reconstruct the communist state permeated with the communist party ideology, newly independent Russia’s first president purposefully stimulated political pluralism and the decentralisation of power. Attempts were made by fits and starts throughout Yeltsin’s entire tenure to embed the principles of a separation of powers, political competition and turning an idea of civil society into social practice. Even when unable de facto to carry out his administrative duties during his second term as president, Yeltsin continued to zealously uphold the freedom of the press. However, while recognising Yeltsin’s merits, it is necessary to point out that, as a whole, the system he was building, as with any other transition system, remained crossbred and internally inconsistent. Probably its main (though not the only) contradiction was a combination of personified authority and a democratic mode of legitimation. In the 1990s, Russia became a typical non-liberal democracy1, which 1 Zakaria F., The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, New York: W.W. Norton, 2003. 74 thE Russian paRliamEnt anD vlaDimiR putin’s pREsiDEnCy means that elections were held on a regular basis, but the decisionmaking processes within the political structures which those elections made legitimate were most often not liberal in spirit. Russia had serious problems with human rights, excessive government intervention in all spheres of social life, and maintaining the supremacy of law. The principles of separation of powers and independent courts were adhered to, but only incompletely and selectively. The level of the population’s alienation from the government institutions kept rising, which caused a special headache for the representative bodies of power; suffice it to recall that since the middle of the 1990s, the level of trust in both houses of Parliament has seldom exceeded ten percent. For all that, the development of authoritarian trends, which were no doubt close to the heart of Yeltsin as the head of state, was contained by several systemic factors2. First of all, the presidential authority was checked and balanced by the other branches of power. During Yeltsin’s reign, the legislative branch of power grew increasingly mature as an institution and acted as the centre for the opposition. Additionally, the judiciary, especially the Constitutional Court, repeatedly claimed greater independence. Secondly, the Russian regions and their democratically elected heads acted as a powerful counterbalance to the Kremlin in the 1990s, when they became aware of the benefits of federalism and began to use the upper house of Parliament – the Federation Council – as the main tribunal for upholding their interests. Thirdly, the regime was forced to maintain an equilibrium between various oligarchic lobbies in an effort to balance the interests of one against another. Fourthly, inside his inner circle, Yeltsin tried to make the rival groupings – the “liberals” and the siloviki – toe the line. Lastly, it was impossible to ignore the rapidly evolving civil society, which was capable of bringing measurable pressure upon the government from time to time. The combination of these factors resulted in the end of violence being a core tool of state policy. Strong opposition, both right- and left-wing, appeared in Russian society in the middle of the 1990s and its political activities grew increasingly well-ordered in character. The scale...

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