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auThoriTy and idenTiTy in russia Marie Mendras The question of the state is central in Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, ruling elites gave more attention to economic restructuring and to power-building than to a profound reform of the state organization. With privatizations and the new market conditions, the state and its organs appeared to be an outmoded system of rule that would impede reforms if given too much weight. Since he became President of Russia, Vladimir Putin has claimed to restore the power and centralizing function of the state. In fact, he is strengthening his office and his own presidential administration at the expense of other public institutions: the government, the Parliament, regional authorities, municipalities, and social institutions like political parties, trade unions, civic associations. This study seeks first to explain Russian policies with an emphasis on the role of the various public administrations and the lack of a new conception of a democratic state. In a second part, the relations of Russian elites and societytowardEuropewillbeaddressed,showingtheambiguityofcombined attraction and resistance to Western expectations and norms of conduct. Authority Building or Power Building? In the course of 15 years of reforms, from Gorbachev’s perestroika to Putin’s strategy of central control, state organizations have undergone extensive restructuring. Institutional and financial reforms have reshaped many public bodies. The switch to capitalism has had a powerful impact on modes of governance. Recent developments point to a backlash in state reform, and in the very conception of a federal and democratic system of rule. The power of administrations Administrations in Russia have successfully adjusted to the new conditions and have consolidated their positions in the economic, social and political realms. At all territorial levels, they have come out stronger after those years of change and turmoil and more immune to political pressure and legal constraints. This may at first appear to be a surprising phenomenon in a time of state weakness and privatization of the economy. Bureaucracies have demonstrated a remarkable ability to adjust to a changing context and to the emergence of many new actors (private enterprises, financial 14 authoRity anD iDEntity in Russia holdings, foreign investors, citizens, political parties, associations, etc). Our working hypothesis is that, if administrations have reinforced their positions, it means that they have a functionality of their own. They perform tasks that are absolutely crucial to the state and to society at large, and to the individual and to businesses. Administrations have made themselves indispensable partners of most social actors, from the citizen or public service user to the big oil producer. This is not primarily due to coercion or arbitrary power on their part but, more significantly, on their functionality as organizations and on the diversity amongst administrations, as well as within each administration. The bureaucracy exists as an idea, as a concept, it does not exist as an entity. Codes of conduct in the many state administrations vary greatly. The behaviour of one chinovnik may differ widely from that of his colleague next door. I wish to address the question of the current leadership’s attitudes to what is publicly denounced as “over-bureaucratization”. Do the leaders show a good understanding of the problem and do they propose convincing responses? Work in social theory and studies in sociology of organizations have inspired my argument. Herbert Simon, Robert Merton, and Michel Crozier provide rich conceptual frameworks and in-depth analysis of the workings of administrative or entrepreneurial organizations. They oppose the rationalist approach whereby pre-determined conditions and predetermined goals lead to rational conduct. Crozier and Friedberg recall the 19th century positivist rationalism. Saint Simon, Comte, Hegel, Marx, Lenin predicted the advent of a “rational society”. In Saint Simon’s words, “the rule of men will be replaced by the administration of things”, announcing the end of politics. The observation of contemporary societies demonstrates that “there are no fully monitored or controlled social systems.”1 “Action and intervention of man on man, i.e. power and its “shameful” side, manipulation and blackmail, are co-substantial to any collective enterprise, precisely because there is no structural and social determinism and because conditioning can never be total”.2 Uncertainty and the indeterminate are key factors in social negotiation, that is to say power politics. I will argue that at the rhetorical level President Putin tends to adhere to a rationalist vision of his power, whereas in his practical management he 1 Crozier Michel and Friedberg Ehrard, L’acteur et le système...

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