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3. Plutarch’s argument in Maxime cum principibus 3.1. The philosopher’s φιλοκαλία: humane behaviour for the benefit of the whole community (776A-777B) The opening sentence of Maxime cum principibus is carefully composed . With regard to content, it falls into two sections of unequal length. The first part of the sentence, written in a circumstantial and high style, immediately introduces Plutarch’s own position: the philosopher who strikes up a friendship with a ruler proves his love of honourable things and of his humanity, and shows himself as the true politician (776ab). In spite of the text corruption, there can be little doubt that the friendship in question is that of the philosopher and the ruler. Indeed, this friendship proves to be useful and fruitful, both in private and in public life. This emphasis on the great benefits of this friendship between philosophers and rulers forms one of the Leitmotifs throughout the whole work. The clear dichotomy between public and private life, underlined stylistically by emphatic anaphora and strict parallelism, is not self-evident. Plutarch actually makes the strong claim that a friendship between the philosopher and the ruler not only guarantees the good administration of political affairs, but that it also has a positive influence on private life (and not merely on the private life of the ruler himself, but on that of many: πολλοῖς). Through the person of the ruler, the philosopher can apparently influence an improvement in the private living conditions of many of his subjects. Somewhat more difficult is the question of how to interpret this φιλία more precisely. Probably, φιλία should here not be understood in the most strict sense of an ideal, philosophically based friendship, but rather has the broader meaning of εὔνοια1 . Indeed, although the possibility of true friendship between philosopher and ruler should perhaps not be excluded a priori2 , Plutarch seems to have in mind primarily 1 Cf. Quaest. conv. 659ef on Polybius’ advice to Scipio Africanus never to return from the forum without having gained a new friend: φίλον δεῖ μὴ πικρῶς μηδὲ σοφιστικῶς ἀκούειν ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀμετάπτωτον καὶ βέβαιον, ἀλλὰ κοινῶς τὸν εὔνουν. On the connection between φιλία and εὔνοια, cf. also E.N. O’Neil (1997), 113-114. 2 It is clear, however, that the question of equality among friends can in this context cause additional problems: can the philosopher become a real friend of the 72 plutarch’s argument in MAXIME CUM PRINCIPIBUS a relation of a somewhat different kind. Whereas true friendship can only be won after long efforts3 and requires even more efforts in order to survive4 , the feelings of εὔνοια seem more fitting in the context of political relations5 . The philosopher should converse with the ruler (διαλέγεσθαι)6 : he should give his advice and act as a trusted counsellor , but not necessarily as the most intimate friend7 . However that may be, Plutarch clearly approves of such ‘friendship ’ between the philosopher and the ruler. Moreover, his positive evaluation concerns all the different phases of the process of φιλία, which are enumerated in their chronological order: holding friendship in honour (τιμᾶν), searching after it actively (μετιέναι), receiving it favourably when it arrives (προσδέχεσθαι), and further cultivating it (γεωργεῖν). Even the theoretical appreciation of friendship between the philosopher and the ruler thus demonstrates φιλοκαλία. This theoretical esteem, however, should be translated into concrete action8 , and after striking up friendship with a ruler, the philosopher should further culruler even though he will always be subservient to him? In Aristotle’s view, unequal friendships (φιλίαι καθ᾿ ὑπεροχήν) are indeed possible (e.g., between parents and children, or between a ruler and his subjects; cf. EN 8, 1158b11-28 and 1163a24-1163b28). But even if a friendly relationship between ruler and subject can be called a friendship, the ruler and his subject themselves cannot be regarded as friends (cf. EE 7, 1239a36 : αἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον αἱ δὲ καθ᾿ ὑπεροχήν εἰσιν. φιλίαι μὲν οὖν ἀμφότεραι, φίλοι δ᾿ οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα. ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ φίλος, φιλεῖ δέ γε καὶ φιλεῖται; cf. also EE 7, 1242a9-11). 3 De am. mult. 94e and 94f; cf. also 94b. 4 De am. mult. 95e. 5 Quaest. conv. 660a: φιλία γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ καὶ δι᾿ ἀρετῆς ἁλώσιμον· εὔνοια δὲ καὶ χρείᾳ καὶ ὁμιλίᾳ καὶ παιδιᾷ πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπάγεται, καιρὸν λαβοῦσα πειθοῦς φιλανθρώπου καὶ χάριτος συνεργόν; cf. also Alcinous, Didasc. 33, 187.15-20. One should note that in Rome, the term friendship also had a broad meaning in a political context; see, e.g., Q. Tullius Cicero, pet. 16 and Seneca, epist. 3,1. Cf. also the position of Cicero, who complaints that he is surrounded by a crowd of political “friends” at the forum, whereas he cannot find one true friend with whom he can joke (Att. 1,18,1). 6 Cf. the Greek title of the work (although it is not certain whether it can be traced back to Plutarch himself): Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι μάλιστα τοῖς ἡγεμόσι δεῖ τὸν φιλόσοφον διαλέγεσθαι; cf. also 776b: προσδιαλέγηται καὶ προσκαθίζῃ, 776c: διαλέγεσθαι, etc. 7 Cf. the fragments of a letter...

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