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292 Document No. 28: Record of Conversation between Mikhail gorbachev and Józef Czyrek September 23, 1988 This extraordinary conversation provides additional evidence that Gorbachev had changed Moscow’s relationship with Eastern Europeans much earlier than usually assumed. Here, Polish Politburo member and former Foreign Minister Józef Czyrek has a lengthy discussion with the Soviet leader in Moscow, not asking for his permission but informing him that the Polish communists have decided to start the process of Roundtable negotiations with the opposition, including the Catholic Church and Solidarity. The Polish Politburo discussed opening such negotiations at Czyrek’s initiative on August 21, and passed the formal resolution on September 2. According to the Polish transcripts, these discussions did not even mention the Soviet factor, which indicates that by August, probably as the result of Gorbachev’s visit to Poland in July, the Polish leadership was not concerned about the possibility that the USSR would resort to force or other outright pressure. Here, Czyrek respectfully informs Gorbachev about a decision that has already been made. In turn, the Soviet leader treats his visitor not as a supplicant but as a peer. Gorbachev is mainly listening and learning about the situation in Poland. But he also gets involved in the discussion of personnel issues—something he usually avoided— in this case, the consideration of candidates for the position of prime minister. Despite the vice of excessive ambition, Rakowski seems to be the best candidate , both agree. (The pattern of this conversation would repeat in Rakowski’s own phone call to Gorbachev on August 22, 1989. Contrary to press reports of the time, which would claim that Rakowski had to ask for the Soviet leader’s permission to allow a Solidarity-led government, the actual discussion would consist of Rakowski informing Gorbachev and the latter agreeing.)19 In the conversation below, Czyrek tells Gorbachev that the Polish leadership hopes to split the opposition by “co-opt[ing] the banner of Solidarity along with Wałęsa.” Thus, the June 1989 elections to the Sejm will allow for opposition candidates while preserving 40 percent of the seats for the PUWP, with the result that the government will be formed with representatives from the opposition. (In fact, after an overwhelming victory, the opposition would form the government). Gorbachev expresses his full approval for the Roundtable approach and the program of Polish reforms. Czyrek thanks him with the telling phrase, “Poland is your testing ground.” 19 Foreign Minister genscher’s Notes of the Conversation between Chancellor Kohl and Minister President Németh and Foreign Minister Horn, Palais gymnych, August 25, 1989, published in Kuster, Deutsche Einheit, 377–380. Melyakova book.indb 292 2010.04.12. 16:20 293 Gorbachev: asks the Polish guest to what extent the outbreak of strikes reflects deep processes in the country and to what extent it represents the result of subversive actions of the opposition. Czyrek: These events have several causes. The first is our weakness. In Katowice , where the strikes started, the administration dragged out the introduction of the “Miner’s Charter” for too long, even though the miners had demanded it for a long time. We should have started negotiations with them to establish fair wages. Now, as a result of shrinking rates for work on Saturdays and Sundays, they lost more than 30 percent of their salaries. Another reason—during the reorganization implemented last fall, we preserved the old system of management in the coal industry, and multi-thousand strong collectives did not have their own self-government. The bureaucracy, which works like an army organization, allowed a gap to form between the collectives and the managerial apparatus. The mines were not granted the same rights that were given to the industrial enterprises, but instead agglomerations were created in the coal industry, which creates a concentration of a lot of bureaucrats , whom the workers see as free-loaders who live on their account. In addition, Katowice became something like a closed zone; the flow of information to the center was extremely poor. Thirdly and finally, we saw the weakness of the party and state structures, and that many pressing problems were still unresolved. Secretaries of the party committees at the mines receive their salaries where they work, and so they are dependent on the local bosses. They could be paid 150,000 zlotys, or they could be paid 70,000 zlotys. There was no workers’ self-government, and therefore there was nobody to criticize them, make demands, and...

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