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668 Document No. 117: Memorandum from the CC CPSU International Department, “Towards a New Concept of Relations between the USSR and the States of Central and Eastern Europe” January 5, 1990 This remarkable critique of Soviet foreign policy would be unimaginable under any regime prior to Gorbachev’s (or subsequent to Yeltsin’s, for that matter). The cleareyed realists and new thinkers (Rybakov and Ozhereliev) in the International Department of the Central Committee offer their boss, Georgy Shakhnazarov, a devastating indictment of past Soviet practice as well as then-current Soviet confusion. The memo opens with the dramatic statement, “the crisis of the neo-Stalinist model of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe has become a general crisis and has broken into the open arena.” More candor follows: “during the entire post-war period the USSR systematically interfered in the internal affairs of its neighbors, including through the use of military force.” But this was “based on the tacit international acceptance that this region was a sphere of Soviet influence.” Yet, complains the memo, Moscow’s policy priorities are still not clarified—quite a bold statement given that Gorbachev has been asking for a “strategy” paper since June 1986! And why? Because the “[f]oreign policy of the Soviet state has been paralyzed by a sense of the CPSU’s moral responsibility for the current complications the communist parties are facing in Eastern Europe.” The document details a series of “erroneous foreign policy actions” taken “in the outdated spirit of loyalty to a narrow group of party leaders.” The most serious such errors include Gorbachev’s visit to Romania in 1989 and the awarding of Ceauşescu with the order of Lenin; the failure to change the official interpretation of 1968 during Gorbachev’s visit to Czechoslovakia in April 1987; and Gorbachev’s failure to tell the truth about the Katyń massacre during his visit to Poland in 1988. In effect, this is an indictment of every major Gorbachev trip to Eastern Europe. Each of these visits provided “[d]emonstrations of loyalty to leaders who had long lost public support and who were simply hated by the people, were steeped in corruption and obscenely violated the principles of communism they publicly advocated, hurt the interests of the USSR and the CPSU…” And who are the officials in Moscow still working on Eastern Europe? Policy is still “in the hands of people personally responsible for Soviet actions in the spirit of the Brezhnev Doctrine.” In addition, all of Moscow’s ambassadors are useless; they are “as a rule, non-professional ambassadors who lord over the personnel of Soviet services abroad in their customary command style, and adhere to conservative tenets aimed at preserving the status quo.” They “distort[] the real picture of the country” and therefore are unable to forecast events: “Our policy in Romania provides the most stunning example of this.” Melyakova book.indb 668 2010.04.12. 16:21 669 1. ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE REgION At the end of the 1980s, the crisis of the neo-Stalinist model of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe has become a general crisis and has broken out into the open arena. During 1989, in all the states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the accumulated contradictions came together, which led to a change of social order, while in three countries the changes took the form of a chain-reaction (in the gDR and Czechoslovakia they were peaceful, in Romania it was bloody). A palace coup in Bulgaria, although it prevented an open conflict, still came too late. The most significant element in the new situation, in the political sphere, is the end of the era of one-party states in Eastern and Central Europe. Real power is gradually passing into the hands of the leaders of states, governments and parliaments. Communist parties have lost the leading role in society, both de jure and de facto, and are continuing to lose their positions. […] 2. ASSESSMENT OF THE OLD CONCEPT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Until the middle of the 1980s relations between the USSR and these countries were based on the tacit international acceptance that this region was a sphere of Soviet influence. Although, as a matter of fact, this situation was “sanctioned” in theory only in 1968 in the so-called doctrine of limited sovereignty, during the entire post-war period the USSR systematically interfered in the internal affairs of its neighbors...

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