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CHAPTER 8 The Election of the First Belarusian President as a Mirror of Belarusian Preferences Quite a number of authors wrote about the sudden popularity of the new Belarusian president and his appearance on the political scene. In addition to several works devoted to A. G. Lukashenka,1 practically every text analyzing Belarus contains a special chapter describing the phenomenon of a political outsider’s victory and the ensuing transformation of his government into an authoritarian regime. Some authors believe that Lukashenka put forward such a paradigm of power that answered the expectations of the Belarusian majority. It was expressed either in the rational conformity with the proposed scenario of the state existence, or in the acceptance— not always conscious—of the models of interrelationships between individuals and the power that are determined by definite archetypes of social behavior. During the campaign, the candidate for presidency outlined the claims that eloquently depicted the perspective of the state development in case he was elected. In the abstracts to his platform “To lead the people off the precipice,”2 he designated a project of “the author’s government”— a prototype of the future Belarusian authoritarianism, stressing the necessity of “the direct management of state enterprises, appointment of their managers.”3 It hyperbolized the sense of uncertainty in the future that had appeared in Belarusian society at the start of the economic decline caused by a sudden break of the established economic relations after the disintegration of the USSR. Lukashenka promised to return fixed prices and to 1 Some examples of such publications: Rainer Lindner, “The Lukashenka Phenomenon,” in Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinations, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West, ed. Margarita M. Balmaceda, James I. Clem, and Lisbeth L. Tarlow (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 77–108; Stephen White and Elena Korosteleva, “Lukashenko and the Postcommunist Presidency,” in Postcommunist Belarus, ed. S. White, E. Korosteleva, and J. Löwenhardt (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 17–34; Margery MacMahon,“Alexander Lukashenko, President, Republic of Belarus,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 13, no. 4 (December 1997). 2 “The precipice” was intended to mean the state of economy and society after the collapse of the USSR. 3 V. M. Shlyndikov, ed., Sbornik alternativnykh program razvitia Belarusi (Minsk, 2001), http://www.ucpb.org/index.php?page=lib&open=122. regulate the work of industries that were standing idle. The platform spoke of the popular nature of the president’s policy who had to act in accordance with the will of the masses. Such formulations, as Belarusian political scientist Lyakhovich puts it, “served to authorize the head of the state’s actions without taking into account legal or institutional restrictions.”4 Lyakhovich believes that in this project of strengthening the state, there was a foundation ensuing deformations in the system of separation of powers in the country. “Concentration of property and levers of influence in the real sector of economy in the state’s hands has turned into the pivotal mechanism of intensification of the role of the head of the executive power—President.”5 Lukashenka’s promises for a strong leader was popular in Belarus in the early 1990s—the time of social and economic disorder. In 1992 the number of those who sought a strong leader reached 76 percent , it fell to 57 percent in 1994.6 An important factor that gave rise to the sudden popularity of Lukashenka was his anti-corruption raid at the beginning of 1994. Opinion polls showed that in people’s mind bureaucracy and corruption were the worst traits of the communist rule in Belarus.7 Lukashenka modeled his political image on the crest of this wave of discontent, thus emphasizing his uninvolvement in the communist establishment, his “closeness to the people.” As K. Michalisko writes, “Lukashenka’s talent for striking all the right populist chords and drawing attention to himself became evident when he turned his position as state corruption ‘watchdog’ against the Kebich government […] and announced his entry into the race with a spectacular televised denunciation of corruption at the highest levels of defense, foreign affairs and other ministers, citing specific names.”8 Remarkably corruption charges against the country’s high officials did not lead to any real investi4 A. Lyakhovich, “Obzor proektov i idei reformirovania politicheskoi sistemy Belarusi” in Belarus’, Scenarii reform, ed. R. Vaienia, E. Kruglikova, J. Plaskonka, and U. Ramanau (Warsaw: Bathory Foundation 2003), 14. 5 Lyakhovich, “Obzor proektov i idei,” 14. 6 New Democracy Barometer 1991–2000...

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