Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey

Conclusion

Conclusion An important aspect of democratic consolidation is the emergence of a widely shared consensus over constitutional norms, i.e., the rules of the game. Thus, argue Linz and Stepan, “constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.”1 In most democratic transitions, such consensus over constitutional norms was achieved through “elite settlements” or “elite convergence .” While elite settlements refer to sudden and deliberate negotiated compromises among warring elite functions “that precede or are coterminous with democratic transitions,” elite convergences mean a more gradual bridging of ideological gaps through electoral competition .2 Indeed, a large part of the recent literature on transitions to and consolidation of democracy has tended to emphasize the role of political elites. Thus, democratic transitions are seen less as a product of deep-seated structural and cultural factors than as an outcome of negotiations and compromises among rival elite factions, which explains the term crafting democracies.3 As was explained in Chapter 1, none of the Republican constitutions of Turkey (those of 1924, 1961, and 1982), not to mention the earlier experiences during the Ottoman Empire, was the product of an elite settlement or elite convergence, in other words of genuine negotiations and compromises among different representative elite factions. None was adopted by a freely chosen Constituent Assembly broadly representing different interests and different values prevalent among the people. Turkey to?rdelt 03:Whats minta 1 2/24/09 4:27 PM Page 113 The two most recent constitutions of Turkey (those of 1961 and 1982) were the products of military interventions, made with limited or no input by civilian political forces. Therefore, both enjoyed weak political legitimacy. The Constitution of 1961, theoretically speaking the most democratic and liberal constitution Turkey has ever had, was substantially amended in 1971 and 1973 in a less democratic direction following the partial military intervention of 1971. The leaders of the 1980 intervention excluded all organized political forces from the process of constitution-making and adopted the Constitution with the help of a totally appointed Consultative Assembly. Consequently, the 1982 Constitution strongly reflected the authoritarian , statist and anti-liberal views of its founders. Small wonder then that the constitution has become a subject of heated debate and controversy following the transition to a civilian government in 1983. The period since then has been marked by fifteen constitutional amendments analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3. The first constitutional amendment of 1987 was a relatively minor one, except for the fact that it submitted the abolition of the ban on the political activities of former leading politicians to a popular referendum . The abolition of the political bans brought about a significant degree of normalcy to Turkish politics. The process of constitutional reform picked up speed starting from the mid-1990s. The amendments of 1995, while falling short of public expectations, repealed the restrictions on the political activities of civil society institutions and gave political parties a more secure position. The comprehensive constitutional amendments of 2001 and 2004 followed the acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit of 1999. No doubt, the prospects of EU membership provided a powerful stimulus for these constitutional reforms as well as the nine harmonization packages. With these reforms, Turkey has sufficiently satisfied the Copenhagen political criteria and started accession negotiations with the EU. It would be wrong to assume, however, that these reforms were simply an outcome of Turkey’s desire to join the EU. They also responded to the society’s demands for a more democratic and liberal political system. While these fifteen constitutional amendments were significant steps toward liberalization and democratization, it is generally agreed that they have not been able to completely liquidate the authoritarian, sta114 Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey Turkey to?rdelt 03:Whats minta 1 2/24/09 4:27 PM Page 114 tist, and tutelary spirit of the 1982 Constitution; hence the search for an entirely new constitution described in Chapter 6. A certain degree of optimism is suggested by the fact that all constitutional reforms in the post-1983 period were the outcome of broad inter-party negotiations and agreements. In none of these cases did a single party hold the two-thirds majority of...