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Document No. 43: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 9, 1981
- Central European University Press
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259 Document No. 43: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting April 9, 1981 On April 4–5, Soviet leaders Yurii Andropov and Dmitrii Ustinov held a secret meeting with Kania and Jaruzelski in a railroad car near the Polish–Soviet border. According to Soviet Gen. Anatolii Gribkov, who accompanied the two Poles to the aircraft that would take them to the rendezvous, Jaruzelski particularly was in a state of alarm, believing that he might be abducted to the Soviet Union as Dubček had been in 1968, but with the possibility that he might never return to Poland. This was not Moscow’s intention, however, and the meeting took place as planned. The atmosphere was intense. Andropov and Ustinov used the opportunity to harangue the Poles about their inaction, and tried to force them to sign a document committing them to enact martial law by a certain date. Despite his evidently depressed condition—he repeated a request to be relieved as prime minister—Jaruzelski joined Kania in refusing to sign. The discussion also included a reference to introducing foreign troops into Poland. The two Poles utterly rejected the idea but there is no indication in this account who raised the subject. If the Soviets did, it might undercut the argument that Moscow never intended to use force in Poland. Given the intense pressure the two Kremlin envoys applied at this meeting, Andropov ’s characterization of their purpose as being simply to “listen attentively… and provide appropriate explanations” is almost Orwellian. […] 3. On the results of the meeting between Cdes. Yu. V. Andropov and D. F. Ustinov with the Polish friends. Chernenko: In accordance with the decision of the Politburo, Cdes. Andropov and Ustinov met with Cdes. Kania and Jaruzelski. Perhaps we will listen to the comrades. Andropov: D. F. Ustinov and I, in keeping with the agreement with the Polish comrades, went to Brest; our meeting took place in a train car near Brest. The meeting began at 9:00 in the evening and ended at 3:00 in the morning so that it would not be discovered that the Polish comrades had been away. The problem that was put before us was to listen attentively to the Polish comrades and provide appropriate explanations, as agreed at the Politburo session. The general impression from our meeting with the comrades was that they were in a very tense state, they were nervous, and it was clear that they were exhausted . Cde. Kania said straight out that it was very difficult for them to handle these matters. Solidarity and the anti-socialist forces were pressing them hard. But in addition, they declared that since the XXVI CPSU Congress conditions in Poland have moved toward stabilization. Kania said that they held an election meeting in most of the local party organizations and it is important to note 260 that not a single person on the slate of candidates belonged to Solidarity; that is to say, all our candidates passed through to the congress. Then, Cde. Kania was obliged to say that subsequent events, in particular the warning strike and the events in Bydgoszcz, showed that the counter-revolution is stronger than us. They were especially fearful of the warning strike, and even more of a general strike, and were doing everything they could to avert a general strike. “What tasks stand before us?” asked Cde. Kania. Above all, the renewal of trust on the part of the people and party, the mending of economic life, and the elimination of strikes and work stoppages at enterprises. Of course, the Polish comrades have no experience with these negative manifestations, and therefore they do not yet know what methods to employ, and are [merely] shuffling from side to side. As far as the introduction of troops, they said straight out that this is impossible. It is just as unworkable to introduce martial law. They say they will not be understood and they will be powerless to do anything. The comrades stressed in the discussion that they will introduce order by their own means. They have in mind that the IX Congress, for which they are preparing, will not allow Solidarity to advance their candidates as delegates. From party organizations , good workers are being chosen as delegates for the congress. In the discussion, Cde. Kania also noted that the Polish people are very sensitive about honest communications. For example, they announced the congress, then they acted as if they were going to postpone the congress, and then...