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129 Document No. 16: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting October 31, 1980 As a follow-on to the previous document, this record of a Soviet Politburo session recaps a meeting the day before between Soviet leaders and Poland’s Kania and Pińkowski. Brezhnev and his colleagues are pleased with most of the results of the meeting, which aimed at stressing the danger of the situation facing Poland while simultaneously boosting the Poles’ confidence in their ability to deal with it. But other issues clearly raised concerns. For one, Kania underscored how heavily Poland depended on the West for economic aid. For another, he left the clear impression that while the Poles apparently had a plan for cracking down, if need be, they were nowhere near ready to implement the operation—as Brezhnev pointed out. […] 2. Toward the results of the visit to the USSR of First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party Cde. S. Kania and Chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers Cde. J. Pińkowski. Brezhnev: We can say definitively that our meeting with the new Polish leaders was timely. Events in Poland are taking such a turn that if we waste time and do not correct the Polish comrades’ position, then before we know it we will be facing a critical situation that will demand extraordinary and, one might say, painful measures. The Polish comrades did not hide their alarm about the intensified activities of the anti-socialist forces. But when the subject turned to measures in the struggle with the counter-revolution, vacillation crept into their utterances. They declared that Poland is bound by debts hand and foot. All imports from the West are based on credit, and the functioning of many enterprises and the condition of the domestic market depends upon them. Poland’s economy has become dependent primarily on the West. In these conditions, our Polish comrades believe, any exacerbation of the situation in the country could create grounds for the capitalists to refuse further deferment of credits and Poland, in Kania’s words, would be brought to its knees. We asked Kania directly whether the party has a plan in case of an emergency in which an open threat to people’s power arises. He said that there is a plan for that event and that they know who will have to be arrested and how to employ the army. But to all appearances they are not prepared to take such steps and are putting them off for the indefinite future. I will not repeat the entire content of our discussions. The notes from the talks have been circulated and the comrades can acquaint themselves with them if they have not yet managed to do so. 130 As we said at the last session, the goal of the meeting with the Polish comrades was twofold. On the one hand, it was to help them understand the full depth of the danger and induce them to take more drastic actions. On the other hand it was to encourage them and reinforce their faith in their own strength and possibilities. I think that the talks were useful on both counts. Kania, as I already said, displayed a definite reserve, at least on the question of introducing a state of emergency. As for other measures we proposed, he declared that he agrees with them. We also had a complete mutual understanding on the evaluation of the causes of the crisis and the scope of the counter-revolutionary threat. Kania assured me that upon returning to Warsaw he will acquaint the PUWP CC Politburo with our point of view. They took meticulous notes of everything we said. True, Kania mentioned one reservation—that he would not inform certain members of the Politburo fully since he fears an intelligence leak to the West. It is important for the Polish leadership not to permit talk about the fact that they are acting on Moscow’s orders. As far as Kania and Pińkowski personally are concerned, they left a decent impression with me and apparently others who participated in the talks; these are serious, thoughtful people. It is clear what they are worth as political leaders and they can only be judged by their deeds. The comrades will probably agree that at the moment we have done everything required of us on the Polish question. But of course we must stay on the alert. Conditions in Poland are literally in danger of exploding. What ought to...

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