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Kolnai and Kant on (Human) Dignity ZOLTÁN BALÁZS I INTRODUCTION The concept of human dignity is one of the most frequently used and widely applied moral concepts in contemporary Western political discourse . Rightists and leftists, believers and non-believers alike rely on it, on the assumption that its core is undisputed and commonly accepted by every mature human person. But a lack of dispute may well turn out to be a lack of reflection. In fact, the concept of human dignity is quite often defined and circumscribed, but the concept of dignity is not, though, obviously, the former concept must be derived from the latter.1 Kant’s contribution to making the concept of human dignity one of the prevalent ideas of our moral philosophical tradition is huge. But the fact that he nowhere explains exactly what he means by dignity, though he has very elaborate views on a closely related, yet distinct, concept of sublimity, calls for explanation. Although it is impossible to enlarge upon the enormous literature on his moral theory in such a short essay, I shall try to suggest an answer to the question whence this curious unevenness arises. Contrary to Kant, Aurel Kolnai has an explicit account of dignity. In his essay, simply entitled “Dignity” , he distinguishes what he calls “dignity as a quality” from human dignity. The paper was republished in 1995 to provide the conceptual introduction to a distinguished collection of papers on human dignity.2 Yet the editor does not seem to be aware of the irony hiding in the fact that Kolnai thinks that the concept of human dignity is deeply problematic.3 His moral theoretical sympathies lie with personalism, a conception into which human dignity can easily be inserted, but his axiological approach to the realm of values or qualities, which includes dignity , does not unequivocally support such a conception. I shall proceed in the following manner. First, Kolnai’s account of dignity as a quality will be summarised, after which his brief account of human dignity will be analysed. If his account of dignity is correct, then human dignity is only a very imperfect and partial instance of dignity, similar to the dignity of, for instance, some animals or even inanimate objects, and thus it can hardly uphold the entire edifice of our enlightened moral intuitions . Secondly, Kant’s analysis of the sublime will be summarised, and his views on human dignity cited. It will be argued that his account of the EXPLORING THE WORLD OF HUMAN PRACTICE sublime, which is itself heavily influenced by his moral intuitions, establishes the concept of human sublimity, but not of human dignity. Obviously, the concept of human sublimity is too artificial and counterintuitive, and this deficiency is aggravated by the problem that sublimity lacks reciprocity , the idea of mutual respect. Dignity has it, and this explains its increasing importance in Kant’s arguments. However, Kant nowhere shows how the concept of dignity can be meaningfully applied to every human being. II. DIGNITY (i) Kolnai’s phenomenological account of dignity Kolnai does not define dignity in a rigorous manner. His approach is phenomenological , making a survey of related concepts, and suggesting analogies , metaphors, linguistic connotations, both positively—explicating dignity ; and negatively—explicating un-dignity, distinguishing them from similar concepts and contrasting them with opposed ones. Dignity is described as a phenomenon clearly discernible within the realm of values. In what sort of persons might we recognise the traits of dignity? Here is a condensation of Kolnai’s most telling observations.4 A person with dignity is a person who is calm, reserved, self-controlled; who has integrity, autonomy, a centre of gravity, independence, a certain sense of invulnerability ; whose conduct is reliable, predictable, not capricious; who is able to keep distance, to avoid unruly intimacy, yet who is serene and patient, though not passive or resigned; who leads a morally integral, virtuous and principled life; and, most importantly, who is able to accept and put up with the tension between value and reality, with external disorder, with the perpetual change and fickleness of other people. Briefly, such a person has weight. It is important to realise, however, that as the various aspects of dignity might be present in different degrees in different persons (not to speak of the plurality of occasions, ages, contexts in which a particular person may be said to act, speak, etc. with dignity in different degrees), dignity itself is present in different degrees. Kolnai’s way of...

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