Constitutional Democracy

1. Introduction

1. Introduction According to a widespread belief, liberal democracy tries to reconcile mutually exclusive values. No political regime can be both perfectly liberal and perfectly democratic, or so the claim has it; liberalism and democracy cannot be made compatible unless society makes concessions either from what it holds to be valuable about liberalism, or from what it values in democracy —or from both. What makes democracy attractive is that it realizes the rule of the majority, and what makes liberalism attractive is that it protects individual liberty; however, the majority tends to sacrifice individual liberty each time it can enhance its own prospects in this way. Therefore, only by restricting majority rule can liberty be saved, and majority rule cannot obtain unless liberty is restrained. The ideal of liberal democracy is that of a balance between these two values. In what follows, I will refer to this claim as the compromise thesis.1 The usual reasoning behind the compromise thesis goes as follows: the values of liberalism and those of democracy are separate, equally ultimate values (or if they are derivative values, they are nevertheless derived from different ultimate values). Since they are independent from one another, neither of them takes into account the requirements of the other. There is no such thing about liberal values that would compel one to reject states of affairs that are condemned as bad by democratic values; conversely, nothing about democratic values makes us reject that which is condemned by liberal values. Thus, conflict appears overwhelmingly likely, compromise unavoidable. This explanation consists of two parts. First, it holds that ultimate values are independent of one another; second, it assumes that the values of liberalism and those of democracy are either equally ultimate or are derived from different ultimate values. Neither of these claims is obviously true. First one has to face the following difficulty. Values are not facts of nature but rather normative ideals whose content is subject to interpretation; interpretation must satisfy the requirement of coherence. In other words, in- 54 ⁄ Liberal Democracy terpretations are expected to give a comprehensive view of the simultaneously approved values such that in it the latter cohere with and mutually reinforce and elucidate one another. Mutual inconsistency of ultimate values is a residual outcome of attempts of interpretation rather than an obvious starting point for them; it cannot be held unless even the best available interpretation must concede to a lack of coherence. Mutual irreducibility of liberalism and democracy is also in need of justification. It is not evident that the two series of values do not belong to the same lineage with one of them being more basic and the other derivative. For instance, it may be claimed that the values of democracy originate in the more fundamental values of liberalism, by way of the latter being applied to the special problem of collective deliberation and decision making. Or the other way round, one may hold democratic values to be more basic and liberal values to be derivative.2 For my part, I am inclined to accept the coherence hypothesis; furthermore , I think liberalism is expressing basic political values, while democratic values are derivative. In this study, however, I do not argue for either of these claims but take it as my starting point that democratic values are derived from liberal values. Shortly it will be seen why this is justified in the context of the present study. If the thesis claiming that liberal values are fundamental and democratic values are derivative is correct, then the usual justification of the compromise thesis is untenable. It is impossible that the values of democracy should require something that is rejected by liberal values. Yet the analysis may not come to a rest at this point. Liberalism and democracy are not merely sets of values. Political values are realized through the medium of institutions. They cannot obtain unless such institutional rules and procedures are in place that combine the multitude of individual decisions in a way that makes the overall outcome approximate that which is required by these values. Liberalism is not exhausted by the fundamental ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity, but rather it also entails a specific institutional order, first and foremost the institutions of constitutionalism. Neither is democracy exhausted by the abstract ideas of collective deliberation and self-government and political participation but it also involves rules and techniques of collective decision making. A critique of the compromise thesis...