The Demise of Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir

The Joint Brioni Declaration: July 5–12, 1991

The Joint Brioni Declaration 125 The Joint Brioni Declaration July 5–12, 1991 • The C roatian G overnment s pells out f ive demand points to the Presidency • An extraordinary nig httime v isit f rom Ita lian a nd Fre nch a mbassadors • Th e J uly 5 EC Ministerial Council session at The Hague • The European ministers arrive once again, upon invitation from the Federal Government • The July 7 Brioni Declaration: War is at endangered Croatia’s door •  
  

  
   
 himself an unequal Presidency member • European Parliament condemns the use of force, insists YP A withdrawal • General Messerschmidt and observers arrive • Krško nuclear plant in da nger •  
    
  
  
  withdrawal from Croatia would translate into “swimming in blood” •     party v oted f or C hetnik w arlord Še šelj • ! 

"  # $
  “freedom of action” for YPA I was continuously in contact with Zagreb, and with acquaintances and governments from other towns across Croatia, but I was growing more concerned. My anxiety was increased by a letter from Croatian Prime

  

  
  
   
g amassing of units at Croatian borders.”    
        
   ethically and professionally ” at home and abroad, could not g ive up its “role of the dominant subject in the resolution of the Y ugoslavian political crisis.” I n Croatia, not only was the Army not retreating to the barracks, but w as instead g athering in crisis areas. U nits hitherto stationed in other republics, w ere filled up w ith conscripted reserv ists from Serbia and sent daily to Croatia, against Croatia, while “the Yugoslavian Army is removing almost all non-Serbian officers from the territory of C roatia,” according to the letter. O n J uly 5, the C roatian Government asked the following from the SFRY Presidency: 126 The Demise of Yugoslavia • Immediate retreat of all YA1 units on the territory of the Republic of Croatia to their barracks. • A decrease in the number of YA units in the Republic of Croatia. • Notification of civil authorities of every movement of units outside the barracks, at which occasion they will move with escort. • Retreat of YA units from the eastern border of Croatia. • Discontinuation of discrim ination and harassm ent of non-Serbian officers and soldiers and civilians serving in the YA.      
   

n different occasions, and he reg ularly responded that “on the territory of Croatia, inter-people confrontations are g rowing dram atically,” and he discounted the fact Belgrade was passionately g oading Serbs in Croatia toward civ il disobedience and terrorist rebellion. Or that armed Chetnik groups were penetrating Croatia from Serbia and Bosnia, that our police stations were more frequently under attack, which the Army looked at without concern. We ask ed him not to protect Croatia with tanks and he replied: “In Croatia, the situation is continuously deteriorating. Concentrations and groupings of police forces, the National Guard Call, and other armed groups are maintained and increased.” As if our police and beg innings of an arm y were doing this somewhere outside Croatia, or that the groupings had provoked someone on their own territory . He did not sa y a word about the fact Chetnik terrorists had attacked Borovo Naselje while we were in session, nor did he give any kind of report on fiv e hundred parents of Serbian soldiers who went to Lj ubljana ask ing the g enerals to let their sons go home. Neither did he mention the mothers of Macedonian youths, who had had enough of the generals’ political warfare at the expense of their children. Only when T upurkovski remin  

      in a sharp dialog ue, the general shouted angrily: “One VMR2 nationalist comes over here and wants to chase the Army.” 1 Omitting “People” from the of ficial a ppellation of the A rmy is, a t tha t m oment, indicative of the complete loss of confidence in the Army on Croatian side. 2 VMR, later VMRO-DPMNE, Macedonian party that won the first change-of-regime elections. It should be noted that all parties that won the first elections had at least some national or ientation inc luded in the ir pr ograms; how ever, s ome, a s w as the c ase in Slovenia, had it in v ery moderate amounts. Others, such as HDZ in Croatia, or the littlechanged Socialist party in Serbia, were more extreme in their views. VMR could be called a middle-of-the-road option in that context. The Joint Brioni Declaration 127...