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Document No. 67: Hungarian Foreign Ministry Memorandum of Soviet–Hungarian Consultations on the European Security Conference, October 18, 1969 ——————————————————————————————————————————— Between March and October 1969, the Soviet-bloc appeal for a European security conference made considerable progress; several West European countries responded favorably and Finland offered to host the preparatory meetings (although it is still not entirely clear whether this was a Finnish or Soviet initiative). During the Fall, the Kremlin engaged the Hungarians more and more in contrast to the Poles and East Germans who were each espousing proposals for the conference that for different reasons made Moscow decidedly uneasy (see Document Nos. 68 and 69). The document below gives an idea of the issues on which the various sides disagreed. For example, Berlin insisted that a foremost priority of the conference should be diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic—an idea Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov likened to “choking an infant in a cradle” (the infant being the conference on security and cooperation itself). This memorandum also provides important evidence of Moscow’s greater willingness after August 1968 to pursue consensus among the allies through persuasion rather than coercion. Contrary to standard interpretations that hold that once the Soviets had restored order in Czechoslovakia they could do more or less as they pleased within the alliance, Brezhnev and most of his colleagues seem to have recognized they could no longer rule by diktat but had to treat the East European regimes more like partners. Finally, this memo also shows how political rather than military issues came to dominate discussions within the Warsaw Pact during this early period of détente. ____________________ MEMORANDUM FOR THE POLITBURO On October 17, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister [Vladimir Semenov] suggested that we conduct an informal exchange of opinion the next day in Moscow on preparations for the European security conference. With the approval of comrades Kádár, Fock and Pullai the meeting took place on October 18. (At this time, deputy ministers from the Soviet Foreign Ministry were holding similar bilateral talks with representatives from the Foreign Ministries of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania.) In the course of the talks we touched upon the following issues: 1. The standpoint of the Western powers concerning the conference According to comrade Semenov, the situation is complex. We cannot say that we have the conference in our pocket. Though the general public received the idea very well the world over, significant forces are working against it more and more actively. The leaders of the United States, England, West Germany and Italy clearly see that the conference would serve to recognize the realities resulting from World War 347 II, including the de facto recognition of the GDR, the easing of European tensions and the loosening of ties between NATO countries. Therefore, they endorse it with their words, but they are working against it in the background. The French attitude is rather reserved. The French leaders concede that their major political endeavor, the simultaneous weakening of the European position of the two opposing camps, could hardly bear fruit at the conference, so their attitude is characterized by reserve and disinterest. SomeactivitycanbeobservedamongtheleadingcirclesofcertainsmallerEuropean nations (Belgium, Finland). Based on the above analysis, the Soviet leaders have concluded that we can reasonably reckon with the possibility of this conference only if, as a first step, we propose a rather general agenda acceptable to all. This would be served by two Soviet procedural motions, of which the first would declare a renunciation of force, the other the need to improve economic cooperation in a general way. […] 2. The standpoint of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty concerning the preparations and agenda for the conference. With the exception of the Romanians, there is consensus that the foreign ministers should meet in Prague on October 30–31. The Romanian side agrees with that date, but they still propose Bucharest as the site of the meeting. The Soviet comrades told the Romanians that in addition to political reasons there was a procedural motive for choosing Prague: the last time representatives of the Warsaw Treaty met in Prague was in January 1956, while they last met in Bucharest in the summer of 1966. I indicated that the Hungarian side supported Prague. There is also consensus that the security conference should have the two items proposedbytheSovietsideontheagenda.However,somecountriesproposedamendments to the agenda which would automatically make the conference impossible to hold. Thus, the Polish side proposes amendments to the first item on the agenda under...

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