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Document No. 140: Minutes of the Sofia Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Defense, December 17, 1988 ——————————————————————————————————————————— At this Warsaw Pact defense ministers’ meeting 10 days after Mikhail Gorbachev’s U.N. speech (see Document no. 135), Iazov and Kulikov explain the Soviet rationale for making unilateral arms cuts. Although they do not say so below, they were themselves deeply worried about the consequenses of such a move, as were many of their colleagues. Not coincidentally, more than 100 Soviet officers, including Kulikov, were fired within weeks of this meeting. ____________________ General Iazov: […] During its meeting in July 1988, the Political Consultative Committee of the member-states of the Warsaw Pact passed a resolution on the development of recommendations to improve the organizational structure of the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact in order to give them a distinctly defensive character as well to achieve the possible reduction of military forces and armaments in Europe. Commensurate with this resolution, the political and military leadership of the Soviet Union has been working to bring the organizational structure of the Soviet military into line with the defensive military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact. […] After a complex assessment of the military–political situation and the power ratio, in particular in Central Europe, the Soviet leadership has concluded that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact could undertake several measures without waiting for a concrete agreement at the upcoming negotiations on mutual force reductions. […] The grouping of our land forces in Europe as well as a significant portion of our weaponry have been moved forward to face the NATO forces on the FRG border with the GDR and Czechoslovakia. This came about in the wake of World War II. However, at the same time, it was also a conscious decision on our part in response to the continuous buildup of NATO forces in Europe and other actions by the U.S. A significant reduction in tensions in Europe in recent years is noticeable. The current situation does not completely correspond to the Warsaw Pact’s new military doctrine and will be used by the West to insinuate that we intend to attack. Considering the West’s (publicly) expressed uneasiness over the number of divisions and tanks in the Soviet armed forces, we have decided, in coordination with the leadership of all Warsaw Pact member-states, to withdraw six tank divisions (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany—4, Central Group—1, Southern Group—1) as well as an independent anti-aircraft missile contingent (Northern Group) from our military forces and to dissolve these divisions. In addition, the aerial attack squadrons, the army’s aerial attack battalions, as well as several transport units, all training and attack divisions and equipment will be withdrawn and transferred to the Soviet Union. 626 All remaining mobile defense and tank divisions in the GDR and ČSSR will be transferred to a new organizational structure, whereby the number of tanks will be reduced as follows: – from 260 to 155 in the mobile defense division – from 320 to 250 in the tank division […] These measures will result in a reduction in the number of military personnel in the Soviet armed forces by 50,000 and the number of tanks by 5,000, thereby partiallyrectifyingtheimbalanceinthenumberofpersonnelandtanksinCentralEurope . […] In this connection, the divisions in the GDR and ČSSR will have increased defensive capabilities, and their offensive capabilities will be proportionately decreased. […] Altogether, in this region and in the territory of our European allies, the number of tanks will be reduced by 10,000, the number of artillery systems by 8,500 and the number of fighter jets by over 800. […] These measures will in no way weaken our position in the upcoming negotiations on the reduction of military forces and weapons in Europe. We are of the view that information on the planned organizational changes in the Soviet forces will give the ministries of defense in the member-states the opportunity to prepare for corresponding steps to give their national forces a distinctly defensive character within the next two to three years. In completing these measures, we should assume that it is possible to carry out a reduction of the larger armed forces and principal armaments of the member-states in an agreed manner, taking into consideration their position and duties in the collective defense as well as their part in the Unified Forces of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, the evolving military political and strategic situation...

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