In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Document No. 130: Summary of Statement by Marshal Akhromeev on Exchange of Data between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, May 17, 1988 ——————————————————————————————————————————— Ever since the beginning of the MBFR negotiations in 1973, NATO and the Warsaw Pact had been unable to agree on data about each other’s military strength. This meeting , held at the invitation of the Soviet General Staff and Foreign Ministry, shows how the Pact prepared for the exchange of data and what difficulties and problems this posed for the Soviet military. Marshal Sergei Akhromeev provides some of the background , noting that the Americans had opposed swapping data with the Soviet Union, having insisted instead on an exchange between the two alliances, which would compare their overall strength. Although this was the kind of collaboration both sides agreed was needed in order to build mutual trust, this document and others show how the Warsaw Pact tried repeatedly to avoid revealing accurate and relevant data. The fact that the Soviet Foreign Ministry was a co-organizer of this meeting indicates that pressure for compliance was coming from political quarters. ____________________ […] In March 1988, the Soviet side made a proposal for the exchange of data about the armed forces and conventional armaments of NATO and Warsaw Treaty in Europe. Currently the U.S. is rejecting bilateral talks on the exchange of data between the USSR and the U.S. It only considers them possible after negotiations within the framework of alliances. Based on agreements between the Soviet Union and [other] Warsaw Treaty member -states in 1986, the Soviet comrades are now prepared for a possible exchange of data between NATO and Warsaw Treaty. Accordingly, Marshal of the Soviet Union [Sergei] Akhromeev proposed a “Zone of Reduction of Forces and Conventional Armaments” that would permit an assessment of the two military alliances […] as a whole, according to regions (Northern Europe, Central Europe and Southern Europe), as well as according to individual countries. […] For the prospective negotiations, the following initial figures on the most important categories of armed forces and conventional armaments of NATO and Warsaw Treaty in Europe were provided: 1. Taking into account the components proposed for reductions, the personnel numbers of land forces and air force (tactical air force) are: – in NATO – 2.4 million men – in the Warsaw Treaty – 2.3 million men 592 2. The number of units (divisions, brigades, and equivalents of divisions) is approximately the same, i.e. – in NATO – 171 divisions – in the Warsaw Treaty – 175 divisions 3. Most important armament types: – Superiority of NATO – tactical air force – 1.2 fold – among them fighters – 1.6 fold – combat helicopters – 1.5 fold – anti-tank missile systems – 1.5 fold – of Warsaw Treaty – launching pads for tactical missiles – 7.6 fold – tanks – 2.0 fold – mine launchers, cannons, and mortars – 1.2 fold – armored personnel carriers – 1.3 fold […] Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeev emphasized in this context how there will be a number of problems in general negotiations, since overall 23 states have to be brought “under one hat.” FromtheUSSR’sperspective,thefollowingnegotiatingstagesbetweentheWarsaw Treaty and NATO might be considered: 1st Stage Exchange of data on armed forces and conventional armaments, and elimination of asymmetries 2nd Stage Reduction of forces on both sides by the same percentage 3rd Stage Creation of an inability to attack on both sides (so far there are no clear ideas concerning this 3rd stage) Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeev envisaged organizing the preparation of the respective figures, if possible, as follows: – at the end of May/beginning of June 1988 bilateral consultations between the General Staff of the USSR forces and the respective General Staffs (the Main Staff) [of the Warsaw Treaty member-states] and – between 20 June and 25 June 1988 conclude work on these problems, including a joint consultation in Moscow, and prepare the required figures for the Political Consultative Committee The Political Consultative Committee would have to decide whether a reciprocal publication of figures is envisaged, or whether, in case of a rejection by NATO, a different decision will have to be made. Proposals tabled by the Soviet side met in principle with the consent of the delegation leaders of fraternal armies. [Source: VA-01/32661, BA-MA. Translated by Bernd Schaefer.] 593 ...

Share