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Document No. 124: Summary of a Consultation of Chiefs of Staff in Moscow, October 14, 1987 ——————————————————————————————————————————— At this meeting of Warsaw Pact chiefs of staff, an array of top Soviet military officials –Pavlov,5 Kulikov, Akhromeev, Gareev6–took turns informing their colleagues of the changes in military doctrine agreed to by the recent PCC meeting (see previous document). While they dutifully present the official Gorbachev position, it is clear they disagree with important parts of it, especially such concepts as yielding territory to NATO in case of war. ____________________ […] The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member-states: […] All measures have to ensure strategic military parity and a reliable defense. The main method of defense against aggression will be countermeasures and retaliatory strikes (meeting engagements). The role of defense is increasing. Its character is changing to the effect that in strategic terms it is no longer an enforced, but an intended manner type of combat. To a certain extent the adversary will have the strategic initiative by unleashing a war. Therefore, we have to thwart his aggressive goals, achieve a reversal in combat within short time, and take over the strategic initiative. Thus forces and equipment corresponding to the aggressive capabilities of the adversary must be available constantly. In order to lose as little territory as possible, a steadfast defense has to be organized . Therefore the main line of defense must not be at a distance of 20–40 kilometers from the state border, as it used to be, but only 5–10 kilometers, or else directly at the border. […] Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, [Viktor] Kulikov […] stressed that the Unified Forces’ renunciation of preemptive action would result in certain military –strategic advantages for the aggressor, since he can choose the time to unleash a war, and get his forces and equipment fully ready. […] Theprincipleofdefensivesufficiencyofforcesandequipmentdoesnotonlyinclude the ability to thwart aggression, but also the ability to destroy the adversary through resolute acts of aggression. Sufficiency therefore means in no way a reduction of our military potential, as some comrades have wrongfully assumed. 5 Aleksandr G. Pavlov, chief of military intelligence. 6 Makhmut A. Gareev, deputy chief of general staff. 572 The extent of sufficiency does not primarily depend on us, but on NATO. Its forces and armaments obviously exceed the capacity needed for defense only. Everything has to be done so that our forces will not fall behind the adversary. More attention than before must be paid to quality. Primarily those forces that would enter combat first are what need to be developed. If necessary, structural changes and a redistribution of forces and equipment must be undertaken. The effort to equip the armies of the Warsaw Treaty member-states with modern technologystillhasitsweakspots.Thisrefersespeciallytotanksandanti-tankartillery. Forty-nine percent of our aircraft and 19 percent of our ships are outdated. Solving these problems requires us not to reduce military expenses. […] The question of the enemy breaking through to our own territory during the opening period of a war still remains unresolved. In principle, we have to assume that such a possibility exists. Therefore, we have to train the leadership and the troops to destroy the invading enemy forces by counterattacks. […] [Source: AZN 32659, 65–71, BA-MA. Translated by Karen Riechert.] 573 ...

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