Readings in Methodology: African Perspectives

5. Scientific Logics and Methodologies

5 Scientific Logics and Methodologies Gbocho Akissi Logic: From Refusal to Evocation Unfavorable prejudices with respect to logic have kept it at arms-length from methodological problems for some time. During the Renaissance, Montaigne accused Aristotelian syllogistic logic of making minds “muddled and smoky.” German idealism rejected it. Kant and Hegel, for example, finding it closed, complete, sterile and not fruitful, substituted, respectively, a transcendental logic and a contradictory logic. Researchers in social sciences have followed closely behind them, suspecting logic of evading the rich empirical reality and then undertaking to construct methods particular to their sciences. All this primitive, age-old mentality even led thinkers to relativize logic culturally and ideologically. This scorn resulted in both ignorance and a belated evolution of logic. Of late, the boundaries of this ostracism are more and more retracting and the idea of a contribution of logic to methodological and doctrinal research no longer negatively clashes with the consciousness of the researcher. This change is due to three principle factors: research in logic by Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein has shown that this discipline cannot be reduced to the syllogistic, which is only one part of it. Next, the success of methodologies in physical sciences, resulting in part from the contribution of logic and mathematics to quantification, led to lessening the discredit against logic. Finally, Quine’s reflections on the philosophy of logic showed its involvement in all undertakings in radical translation. Radical translation being the decoding of statements of a subject language into those of a metalanguage different from the source language, all research in the field can be considered as an effort at radical translation. Quine argued why and how logic – especially bivalent logic – is embedded in such a venture without, however, being relative and vivid. This chapter will attempt to initiate thought between logic and methodology. It comprises the key concepts to which the concept of logic refers, i.e. “reasoning,” 88 Readings in Methodology: African Perspectives “argument,” and “proof.” By defining logic as the science of reasoning, I determine the nature of reasoning and identify the sophistic pitfalls which are strewn about the field of argument. A series of rules designed for researchers and those who write scientific texts are proposed. Logic and Functions of Language Like all terms in ordinary language, “logic” is an ambiguous concept. Out of the various possibilities, we will choose five essential meanings. In its scientific sense, which is the subject of this work, “logic” means “the operation of the mind” and includes three fundamental concepts: calculation, rule, combinatorics that we will examine through the concepts of “reasoning,” “argument ,” and “proof.” In the common meaning, i.e. doxa, “logic” refers to “opinions,” “personal vision,” or “group vision.” More basically, the term refers to what I would readily call “ontological assumptions” of a linguistic community, an ideological group, a culture, a people, a civilization, a theory, i.e., the set of beliefs, values and hypotheses which serve as their cognitive or pragmatic horizon, premises or postulates of arguments. The assumptions may be relative, as, for example, in the expressions, “I have my logic, you have yours;” “European logic,” “African logic,” “Asian logic;” or in “logic of political parties.”1 They can also be absolute, objective, made of the set of universal values and beliefs of humanity; for example, “logic of human and citizen’s rights.” In a third meaning, “logic” is a synonym of “method,” or “approach,” “process of scientific activity;” or “conditions of possibility” as in the expression: “Logic of scientific discovery.” In another sense, it refers to the quiddity or essential meaning of a concept. In the expressions such as “logic of domination,” “logic of politics,” “logic of forgiveness”, for example, the term is used to refer to bother their quiddity and the conceptual constraints thereby linked as the very result of their meanings. Finally, “logic” designates the structural or structuring organization of something; e.g. “logic of cities.” There are certainly semantic affinities between the last meanings of the concept, just as there are other meanings. But it is important to draw a line of demarcation between the second which is subjective and the first which is objective. The physical and social sciences are all aimed at knowledge, thanks to which we can hope to leave behind ignorance, a source of irritation and intellectual or pragmatic confusion. Knowledge, however, can only fulfill this function provided that it is the expression of the truth. The relationship between the informed subject and...