West Africa's Trouble Spots and the Imperative for Peace-Building

9 The Role of External Actors

9 The Role of External Actors A study of this nature cannot be complete without also examining the role or possible roles played by external actors in both the generation and resolution of conflicts in the region, especially in the Mano River Union. Some of these actors include the United States, France, mercenary organisations like Executive Outcomes and Sandline, and many NGOs, especially Humanitarian NGOs. A major question that has often been raised is whether extra-African initiatives on conflict management are complementary to, competitive with or capable , in the long run, of supplanting existing autochthonous structures? It has been argued for instance, that the undertaking of extra initiatives conforms to the long-standing western tradition of seeking to play a prominent role in (re) shaping the destiny of Africans.1 Often times, extra African interventions raise more questions than answers. However, there is a case to be made for external assistance or complementarity in seeking solutions to some of Africa’s intractable conflicts. External actors are usually necessary in providing support for the demobilization programme, training and reintegration of former combatants, funding advice and provision of neutral observers for post-war election purposes. Also, they are required for the training of judges, police and parliamentarians, support for an independent media; and equally play an important role in helping former armed rebels to become acceptable political players. Unlike in the 1970s when foreign military interventions were rampant in Africa, the 1990s witnessed a much-reduced interest in African conflicts, rather like half-hearted efforts at complementary regional conflict resolution efforts. This is probably as a result of the end of cold war politics. Also, a justification of this maybe as a result of the fact that attention by extra-continental powers West Africa’s Trouble Spots and the Imperative for Peace-Building 83 was riveted on the geo-strategically explosive situations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. However, it suffices to note that there was what may be regarded as ‘Afro-pessimism’ amongst Africa’s development partners, a situation in which donors were simply tired of African problems, and therefore diverted attention away from Africa. In this case, the areas where assistance was required from external partners included logistics, command and control, communications, capacity building and funding.2 As a way of responding to the conflicts in West Africa and to future conflicts that may arise, the United States did put forward the idea of an African Crisis Response Force, later African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The initial expectation was that of establishing a standing force of about 10,000 troops with a view to being in a position to intervene rapidly in conflict situations with grave humanitarian crisis. After almost a year of extensive consultations by the US with its allies (Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Brazil, the Netherlands, Germany and Japan) and with African Governments as well as with the UN and the OAU, this initial plan was abandoned and instead, an ‘inter-operable peace-keeping capability offering training to African States interested in enhancing their peace-keeping capacity’ was established.3 Even then, this initiative was just not available to all willing states, but only to those with (sic) ‘stable democratic countries that can work together to maintain peace on the continent’. Nigeria in particular, had problems with this initiative, as it was then under military rule, though it was spearheading the ECOWAS regional force. Some African States that participated in this programme, included Senegal, Uganda, Malawi Mali and Ghana. But all this changed with Nigeria’s successful transition to democratic governance. The US government is presently more predisposed to collaborating with Nigeria. In 2003, it donated six naval vessels to the Nigerian Navy to enhance its capacity in patrolling the coastal waters as a way of checking the nefarious activities of pirates. The pirates who were sabotaging oil pipelines and abducting oil workers for a ransom had caused widespread insecurity in the Niger Delta, and disrupted oil production activities. On the other hand, the rivalry between the United States and France, manifested in the establishment of France’s Reinforcement of African Capacity for Peace-keeping (RECAMP), launched in January 1998. Buoyed up by the success of its Inter-African Stabilisation Mission to Bangui (MISAB) in 1997, this initiative was launched as an exclusively inter-African peacekeeping force.4 However, let us reiterate the fact, that when indeed, urgent assistance was needed from extra Africa powers during the Liberian war, none was forthcoming from both countries. Therefore...